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In 1955, the Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA) was proposed by the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.' Since that
time, well over half of the states have adopted statutes modeled after the
UAA. 2 The purpose of this survey is to explain the principles underlying
recent court decisions interpreting the UAA, and provide a framework for
analyzing future cases.3
I. VALIDITY OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
The UAA provides that a written agreement to submit any present or
future controversy to arbitration "is valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or equity for the revocation of any con-
tract." 4 Several states that have adopted the UAA, however, have tempered
the breadth of this provision by forbidding arbitration agreements to cover
certain matters. 5 Recent decisions suggest various considerations affecting the
1. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT §§ 1-25, 7 U.L.A. 4 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
UAA].
2. Jurisdictions that have enacted statutes modeled after the UAA included
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mich-
igan, Minnesota, Missouri, Neveda, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Penn-
sylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, and Wyoming.
3. See Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act, 1985 Mo. J.
DISPUTE RESOLUTION 173 [hereinafter cited as Recent Developments 19851; Recent
Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act, 1984 Mo. J. DISPUTE RESOLUTION 207
[hereinafter cited as Recent Developments 1984]; Recent Developments: The Uniform
Arbitration Act, 48 Mo. L. REv. 137 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Recent Developments
19831. The 1985 survey collected cases interpreting and applying the UAA decided
between September, 1983 and September, 1984. The 1984 survey collected cases in-
terpreting and applying the UAA decided between September, 1982 and September,
1983. The 1983 survey collected cases interpreting and applying the UAA decided
before September, 1982. This article surveys cases decided between September, 1984
and September, 1985.
4. UAA § 1 provides:
A written agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration or a
provision in a written contract to submit to arbitration any controversy
thereafter arising between the parties is valid, enforceable and irrevocable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract. This act also applies to arbitration agreements between em-
ployers and employees or between their respective representatives [unless
otherwise provided in their agreement].
5. See Recent Developments 1983, supra note 3, at 146.
[Vol. 1986
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validity of an arbitration agreement: (1) the statute may be construed so as
to promote a policy of enforcing arbitration agreements; 6 (2) the possibility
of piecemeal resolution of a dispute may render an arbitration agreement
invalid;7 (3) the terms of the contract and the conditions surrounding its
execution my dictate whether an arbitration clause is enforceable, and by
whom;8 (4) one party may be a member of a class that is not included in
the statute or which requires special attention; 9 and (5) particular state pro-
visions may be superceded in interstate commerce by the Federal Arbitration
Act.' 0
A. Statutory Construction
Generally, state courts have chosen to construe arbitration statutes broadly
in order to promote a policy of enforcing arbitration agreements." However,
two seemingly contradictory arbitration statutes will be construed narrowly,
if feasible, so that the later act will not operate as a repealer by implication.
For example, in Forest Hills v. Weber Inc.,' 2 a dispute arose in a renovation
and construction work contract between the contractor and contractee. As
a result, the contractor filed a demand for arbitration pursuant to their
agreement.' 3 The trial court granted a motion by defendants to stay arbitra-
tion proceedings because when the Missouri legislature enacted the UAA
making arbitration agreements valid and enforceable, they failed to repeal a
statute 4 which renders executory arbitration agreements voidable. 5 The court
of appeals declared that the two statutes were not irreconcilably inconsistent
in that Missouri's arbitration act only applies to written arbitration agree-
ments between commercial persons.' 6 Missouri's version of the UAA does
not apply to other arbitration contracts such as oral arbitration agreements
or written arbitration agreements between non-commercial persons.' 7 The
6. See, e.g., Forest Hills v. Weber Inc., 691 S.W.2d 361 (Mo. Ct. App.
1985).
7. See, e.g., Baldwin Co. v. Weyland Mach. Shop Inc., 14 Ark. App. 118,
685 S.W.2d 537 (Ark. Ct. App. 1985).
8. See, e.g., St. Luke's Hosp. v. Midwest Mechanical Constr., 681 S.W.2d
482 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
9. See e.g., Obstetrics and Gynecologists v. Pepper, 101 Nev. 105, 693 P.2d
1259 (1985).
10. See, e.g., Old Dominion Ins. Co. v. Dependable Reinsurance Co., 472
So. 2d 1365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
11. See id. at 1366.
12. 691 S.W.2d 361 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
13. Id. at 362.
14. Mo. REv. STAT. § 435.010 (1978). This statute, which rendered arbitration
agreements void, was subsequently repealed by the Missouri legislature. Forest Hills,
691 S.W.2d at 362 n.1.
15. Forest Hills, 691 S.W.2d at 362.
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court held that the UAA applied since the contract in question was between
commercial persons and contained a mandatory arbitration clause.'"
Forest Hills also involved the issue whether noncompliance with a pro-
vision in Missouri's version of the UAA renders an arbitration agreement
unenforceable. Specifically, the respondent argued that the arbitration agree-
ment was unenforceable because it did not contain a notice of arbitration as
required by Missouri's arbitration act.' 9 Although the Missouri statute re-
quires that notice be included in each contract, the court reasoned that the
law favors a statutory reading which results in a reasonable interpretation.
Accordingly, the court held that the purpose of the statute would be statisfied
where the parties have actual notice of the arbitration clause.20
In Howard County Board of Education v. Howard County Education
Association,2' the court found that the arbitration clause in a collective bar-
gaining agreement did not satisfy the requirements of the Maryland Arbi-
tration Act, yet the arbitration agreement was nonetheless held enforceable.
Howard Courty involved a grievance filed by a teacher in response to a
classroom observation report of a supervisor. 22 The Board maintained that
the arbitration clause in the collective bargaining agreement was invalid be-
cause it did not contain an explicit reference to the Maryland Arbitration
Act. 2 However, the court found that even though the arbitration agreement
was invalid under the statute it was enforceable under the common law. 24
The court, acknowledging that common law traditionally disfavored arbitra-
tion, relied on the legislative intent demonstrated by passage of Maryland's
arbitration act to augment a public policy argument that the common law
should be changed.25
B. Piecemeal Resolution
In Baldwin Company v. Weyland Machine Shop Inc.,26 an admittedly
valid arbitration agreement was successfully attacked by suppliers who as-
18. Id.
19. Mo. REV. STAT. § 435.460 (Supp. 1982) requires contracts containing
arbitration clauses to contain the following notice: "This contract contains a binding
arbitration provision which may be enforced by parties." For a discussion of the
Missouri arbitration statute, including the notice requirements, see Recent Develop-
ments 1983, supra note 3, at 140-42.
20. Forest Hills, 691 S.W.2d at 363; see also, State ex rel. Tri-City Constr.
v. Marsh, 668 S.W.2d 148 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
21. 61 Md. App. 631, 487 A.2d 1220 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985), cert. granted,
306 Md. 47, 506 A.2d 1190 (1986).
22. Id. at 631, 487 A.2d at 1221.
23. Id. at 634, 487 A.2d at 1223. Absent specific reference to the statute, the
act does not apply to contractual relations between employers and employees. See
MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-206(b) (1984).
24. Howard County, 61 Md. App. at 635, 487 A.2d at 1224.
25. Id.
26. 685 S.W.2d 537 (Ark. Ct. App. 1985).
[Vol. 1986
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serted that they were not parties to the original agreement and were therefore
not bound by it. Baldwin involved a general contractor who contracted with
the University of Arkansas at Pine Bluff, subcontracted with a third party,
and contracted with other parties to supply materials to be used by the
subcontractor. 27 After problems arose, Baldwin attempted to compel not only
the subcontractor but also the suppliers to submit to arbitration pursuant to
the provisions of the principal contract. 2 The court was concerned with two
worthy but possibly conflicting policies: notice/consent versus liberal joinder.
Written consent is necessary before a party can be compelled to submit to
arbitration. 29 Given such a policy the court was hesitant to imply consent
upon the part of a third party. On the other hand, in order to promote
efficiency and insure that the arbitration affords complete relief, the court
found it judicious to provide for liberal joinder in arbitration proceedings.
The pertinent provision in the arbitration clause in the principal contract
between Baldwin and the University referred to other persons "substantially
involved in a common question of fact or law whose presence is required if
complete relief is to be accorded" as fit subjects for joinder. 0 Baldwin argued
that the provision required joinder, but the court held that it simply allowed
joinder of additional consenting parties. 31 Thus, the suppliers were not re-
quired to submit to arbitration; however, the subcontractor was ordered to
submit to arbitration.32
C. Application of Contract Principles
Many decisions determining the validity of arbitration agreements in-
volve an analysis of the contractual language and relationships. Recent cases
indicate that ordinary rules of contract interpretation apply in determining
the validity of a particular provision.
In a dispute involving two parties to a contract containing an arbitration
agreement, the fact that a contractor sues to recover amounts for a subcon-
tractor does not render the arbitration agreement invalid.33 In Board of County
Commissioners v. Cam Construction Co.,34 the prime contractor on a build-
ing project in a dispute with the owner demanded arbitration in accordance
with the terms of the contract. The contract had a clause stating that, "All
claims, and disputes arising out of the contract shall be decided by arbitration
in accordance with the rules of the AAA." ' 35 The owner refused to arbitrate
27. Id. at 538.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 539.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Board of County Comm'r v. Cam Constr., 300 Md. 643, 480 A.2d 795
(1984).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 645, 480 A.2d at 796.
5
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saying that he had no obligation to deal with the subcontractors, although
it was only the general contractor who was demanding arbitration.36 The
court stated that although the subcontractors were not parties to the contract,
a contractor may bring such claims on behalf of a subcontractor, and that
lack of privity between the subcontractor and the contractee is not a bar to
the action.37 Accordingly, the court held that the losses allegedly suffered by
the subcontractors were sufficient to carry the matter to arbitration.38
Another frequently encountered problem involving validity arises where
one party tries to use an arbitration agreement to force a dispute over the
existence of the underlying contract to arbitrate. Generally, courts have held
that if the contract's existence is disputed, a party cannot rely on the arbi-
tration provision of the contract in question to force arbitration.
In McCrary Engineering Corp. v. Town of Upland,3 9 Richard Puckett,
who had been given authorization to perform services for the town of Up-
land, signed an employment contract with McCrary Engineering to perform
engineering services for the town. 40 The town board voted to terminate
McCrary's contract which Puckett had signed. McCrary argued that the
dispute of whether or not Puckett was authorized to sign this contract must
be arbitrated in accordance with the clause in the contract. 41 The court re-
jected this argument and held that, "Because Upland challenges the very
existence of the contractual relationship between McCrary and the town, it
was proper for the trial court to determine the threshold question of whether
an agreement to arbitrate existed. ' 42
Where a third party has contractual rights dependent upon a contract
between two principals, if he can sue on the basis of that contract, it seems
fair to make an arbitration clause binding upon him. For example, a property
owner's association, as third-party beneficiary to a contract between the
design and construction parties on the one hand and the developer on the
other, wanted a trial on damages resulting from defective design and con-
struction of a condominium. In Zac Smith & Company, Inc. v. Moonspinner
Condominium Association, Inc. ,4 the court held that, since the third-party
beneficiary's rights depend upon terms of the contract between promisor and
promisee, the arbitration clause in that contract is valid and binding on the
third-party beneficiary. 4
However, merely because a contract between two parties gives rise to
actionable damages suffered by a third party does not necessarily mean the
36. Id. at 643, 480 A.2d at 795.
37. Id. at 647, 480 A.2d at 797.
38. Id. at 649-53, 480 A.2d at 798-800.
39. 472 N.E.2d 1305 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).
40. 472 N.E.2d at 1306.
41. Id.
42. 472 N.E.2d at 1307.
43. 472 So. 2d 1324 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
44. Id.
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third party should be bound to the arbitration clause in that contract. In a
sewer construction case, Cocke County Board of Highway Commissioners
v. Newport Utlities Board,45 the trial court held Newport liable to the High-
way Board for damages caused by Newport's contractor.4 According to the
Highway Board, the contractor failed to repair roads intersected by sewer
construction. 47 The appellate court affirmed the award of damages but added
that Newport was entitled to indemnification by the contractor. 48 The Ten-
nessee Supreme Court maintained that, although disputes between Newport
and the contractor were subject to the general arbitration clause, the clause
contained no references to litigation directed against Newport. 49 Thus, the
indemnification clause in the contract prevails over the arbitration clause
since it refers specifically to litigation against Newport. The court also held
that the arbitration clause is not valid and binding upon the Highway Board
because the Board was not party to the original contract.50
D. Protected Classes
Occassionally, the validity of an arbitration agreement is disputed be-
cause one of the parties is a member of a protected class against whom the
agreement is not enforceable. Although the majority of these classes are
specifically recognized in state arbitration acts,51 some categories have been
indentified only by courts.5 2
For example, one such class may consist of medical patients who have
agreed to submit malpractice claims to arbitration. 3 In Obstetrics and Gyne-
cologists v. Pepper,5 4 the plaintiff had signed a standardized adhesion con-
tract which contained an agreement to arbitrate. The medical clinic required
all patients to sign this form prior to treatment. The court refused to enforce
the arbitration clause because the clinic did not show that the plantiff made
an informed decision to consent to arbitration.55 The plaintiff did not recall
either signing the agreement to arbitrate or receiving any notice of its presence
or explanation of its meaning. The clinic could not prove that the plaintiff
had received such notice or explanation because it was not the clinic's policy
to give an explanation unless a patient requested it. The court, in dicta,
45. 690 S.W.2d 231 (Tenn. 1985).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 234.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 237.
50. Id.
51. See Recent Developments 1983, supra note 3, at 146.
52. See, e.g., Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 1264 (1968).
53. For a further discussion of medical malpractice arbitration, see Recent
Developments 1983, supra note 3, at 214.
54. 101 Nev. 105, 693 P.2d 1259 (1985).
55. Id. at , 693 P.2d at 1261.
19861
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stated that where the agreement to arbitrate is contained within an adhesion
contract under which the adhering party had little if any ability to negotiate
terms of the the provision, a court should not enforce the agreement against
him unless it can be said that he knew of its existence, understood it and
willingly entered into the agreement5 6
E. Federal Arbitration Act
An agreement which is unenforceable under state law may be revived
under the Federal Arbitration Act . 7 In Old Dominion Insurance Co. v.
Dependable Reinsurance Co."' the court compelled arbitration despite the
fact that arbitration clause was unenforceable under the Florida Arbitration
Act. The arbitration clause was unenforceable because a "retrocession con-
tract" between the parties contained a provision allowing for removal of the
arbitration to Bermuda.5 9 However, the court found that arbitration was
enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act providing for arbitration where
the contractual relations between the two parties involved interstate com-
merce.6 The court also demonstrated the effect of this presumption favoring
arbitration in its treatment of a clause elsewhere in the contract providing
for service of suit. The court held that doubts concerning provisions appar-
ently incompatible with the arbitration clause should be resolved in favor of
arbitration. 6
II. WAIVER
Although there is no UAA provision regarding waiver, the issue generally
arises in the following two contexts. First, a party's behavior may serve as
an implied waiver of contractual arbitration rights. 62 Second, where parties
contractually waive their rights to a judicial remedy, the courts may reserve
jurisdiction where one party asserts the illegality or invalidity of the contract's
arbitration provision. 6
A. Implied Waiver
Implied waiver disputes often arise when one or both parties seek judicial
resolution of a dispute contractually governed by an arbitration clause. Mere
56. Id.
57. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1976); See infra notes 627-81 and accompanying text.
58. 472 So. 2d 1365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
59. Id. at 1367.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., Capital Mortgage Co. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 142 Mich. App.
531, 369 N.W.2d 922 (1985).




Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1986, Iss.  [1986], Art. 13
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1986/iss/13
UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT
filing of a pleading does not necessarily waive the right to compel arbitra-
tion. 6 Courts have indicated however, that public policy should promote
fairness by inferring waiver where a party has participated in litigation to a
degree so extensive as to prejudice the other party's position in an arbitration
forum. 61
1. Jurisdiction
Initial rejection by the designated arbitrating body does not always sur-
render jurisdiciton of the dispute to the courts. In Jorgenson Realty, Inc. v.
Box,6 a dispute between a realty company and the state's Realtors Associ-
ation's Professional Standards Committee, the committee initially declined
to resolve a dispute as provided for by Association rules. Thereafter, plaintiff
realty company filed suit and subsequently learned from the Association that
the arbitrability issue could be appealed to the state association. On the
appeal, the Association determined that the dispute was subject to mandatory
arbitration. The court then stayed its proceedings and the arbitrator rendered
judgment in favor of the Association. The court confirmed the judgment of
the arbitrator, holding that where an association provides its own scheme
for appellate review of disputes which are initially rejected by the arbitrator,
such procedures are within the scope of the Association's rules by which a
member (here, the plaintiff) agrees to be bound upon joining. 67 A waiver of
the Association's jurisdiction could not therefore be inferred from the com-
mittee's initial rejection.
2. Mere Filing
In Cyclone Roofing Co. v. David M. LaFave Co.,61 the court held the
right to compel arbitration could not be waived per se by participation in or
filing a lawsuit. The court noted that the state's statute reflected the legis-
lature's contemplation that a party making application for arbitration do so
after filing suit. In the absence of demonstrated prejudice to the party op-
posing the motion, public policy favored arbitration as the preferred method
of dispute resolution.
Burd Inc. v. Stoneville Furniture Co.,69 reached a similar conclusion,
stating that "[tihere must be judicial litigation of the merits of arbitrable
64. Cyclone Roofing Co. v. David M. LaFave Co., 312 N.C. 224, 321 S.E.2d
872 (1984).
65. Servonation Corp. v. Henry Constr. Co., 74 N.C. App. 479, 328 S.E.2d
843 (1985).
66. 701 P.2d 1256 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985).
67. Id. at 1257-58.
68. 312 N.C. 224, 321 S.E.2d 872 (1984).
69. 134 I1l. App. 3d 149, 479 N.E.2d 962 (1985).
19861
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issues" 70 before waiver occurs. The court acknowledged that waiver could
occur prior to judgment on the merits and reiterated the following factors
to be considered: "Whether the party seeking arbitration (1) has previously
taken steps inconsistent with the intent to invoke arbitration; (2) is unrea-
sonably delayed in seeking arbitration; (3) has acted in bad faith or with
willful misconduct; or (4) has caused undue prejudice." 7 '
Other decisions have placed emphasis on the parties' intent. In River-
front Properties, Ltd. v. Max Factor 111,72 the court refused to foreclose the
respondent's arbitration rights for failure to file a motion to compel arbi-
tration where the substance of the pleading established that claimant's sole
objective in filing was to gain judicial recognition and enforcement of ar-
bitration rights.
Similarly, the court in District Moving & Storage Co. v. Gardiner &
Gardiner,73 stated that "waiver of the right to arbitrate cannot be inferred
in the absence of of a clear expression of intent." ' 74 Thus, where defendant's
actions consisted of (1) filing demurrers to plaintiff's declaration, amended
declaration, and second declaration; (2) submitting memoranda in support
of their demurrer to the first amended petition accompanied by an assertion
that plaintiff should be bound by arbitration clauses in the disputed contracts;
(3) maintaining a consistent position in all subsequent pleadings; and (4) no
final judgment on the merits occurred; the court held that defendant had
not waived the right to compel arbitration because such acts did not evidence
a clear expression of intent to do so.
3. Extensive Participation
Offensive manuevers which extend participation in the litigaiton process
are more likely to be adjudged an implied waiver of arbitration rights. For
example, the court so held in Capital Mortgage Co. v. Coopers & Lybrand,75
on the theory that "summary judgment is the procedural equivalent of a
trial and is a judgment on the merits which bars relitigaiton on the principles
of res judicata. ' ' 76
Where a lawsuit proceeds through extensive discovery before a demand
70. Id. at ,479 N.E.2d at 964.
71. Id. at , 479 N.E. 2d at 964 (citing Christenson v. Dewor Dev., 33
Cal. 3d 778, 783, 661 P.2d 1088, 1090, 191 Cal. Rptr. 8, 10 (1983)).
72. 460 So. 2d 948 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
73. 63 Md. App. 96, 492 A.2d 319, cert. granted, 304 Md. 362, 499 A.2d
191 (1985).
74. Id. at 105, 492 A.2d at 324 (quoting Charles J. Frank v. Assoc. Jewish
Charities, 294 Md. 443, 450 A.2d 1304 (1983)).
75. 142 Mich. App. 536, 369 N.W.2d 922 (1985).
76. Id. at 536, 369 N.W.2d at 925 (quoting City of Detroit v. Nortown The-
atre, 116 Mich App. 386, 323 N.W. 2d 411 (1982)).
[Vol. 1986
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for arbitration is made, courts are particularly sensitive to the possible prej-
udice a party may incur vis a vis his arbitration position. 7 In Servomation
Corp. v. Henry Construction Co.,78 the defendant pleaded several defenses
including failure to submit the dispute to arbitration as required by contract.
Defendant also filed a complaint for third party indemnity, served numerous
interrogatories (which plaintiff answered), and filed a motion for summary
judgment, alternatively requesting an order to stay litigation and compel
arbitration. Upon remand following the final Cyclone Roofing decision, 79
the court of appeals upheld the trial court's refusal to compel arbitration.
The court reasoned that public policy still favored application of waiver
principles where extensive discovery resulted in "manifest detriment" to the
opposing party.80
B. Other Waiver Issues
Extensive participation in arbitration proceedings may waive the defense
of non-arbitrability. In Jaffe v. Nocera,8' the court refused to allow the
defendant to contest the arbitratior's award on the theory that the arbitrator
had exceeded his powers in holding defendant personally liable after defend-
ant participated in two days of arbitration hearings, testifying and defending
his case on the merits, without raising the issue of personal liability.
On the other hand, a refusal to honor an arbitration agreement does
not necessarily subject that party to automatic liability. 82 Cunningham v.
Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance Co.83 refused to recognize a new
cause of action which would conclusively presume the insurer liable to pay
an uninsured motorist claim upon failure to timely honor an arbitration
provision. The traditional cause of action to compel arbitration was deemed
to be a sufficient remedy.
Although parties to a contract may waive their right to a judicial remedy
by express consent,8 courts allow judicial review where a party raises an
77. Implied waiver cases resulting from extensive proceedings which prejudice
the opposing party's negotiation position should be distinguished from waiver under
the applicable statute of limitations expressly provided in a contract. See, W.J. Adams
v. Nelsen, 313 N.C. 442, 329 S.E.2d 322 (1985).
78. 74 N.C. App. 479, 328 S.E.2d 843 (1985).
79. Cyclone Roofing Co. v. David M. LaFave Co., 312 N.C. 224, 321 S.E.2d
872 (1984).
80. 70 N.C. App. 309, 318 S.E.2d 904 (1984) aff'd after remand, 74 N.C.
App. 479, 328 S.E.2d 843 (1985), rev'd, 316 N.C. 543, 342 S.E.2d 853 (1986).
81. 493 A.2d 1003 (D.C. App. 1985).
82. Some jurisdictions hold that the insurer's breach of an agreement to ar-
bitrate acts as a waiver of insurer's right to compel arbitration, effectively permitting
the insured an opportunity to bring his claim in a court of law.
83. 340 Pa. Super. 130, 489 A.2d 875 (1985).
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allegation of the contract's illegality. 5 In Grissom v. Greener & Summer
Construction,8 6 the court ruled that since the legislature explicitly provided
for judicial review in cases of fraud, mistake, or arbitrator misconduct,87 an
agreement to waive the parties' rights to an appeal was subject to judicial
review only in those three instances. 8 The decision relied on the public policy
of harmonizing legislatively mandated review with considerations of judicial
economy which discourage reopening the merits of a case already decided
through arbitration. 89
III. ARBITRABILITY
Unless prohibited by statute or public policy, almost any dispute may
be submitted to arbitration provided the parties have agreed to arbitrate their
disputes and have manifested that intention in an arbitration agreement.
Parties, however, sometimes disagree on whether an arbitration agreement
applies to a specific dispute. At this juncture, a court must be called upon
to settle the issue of arbitrability. 90 The term "arbitrability" refers to whether
a controversy is subject to arbitration. 9' When determining arbitrability, courts
examine both the existence and scope of an arbitration agreement. 92 Michigan
courts have established a three-prong test to determine whether an issue is
arbitrable: (1) whether an enforceble arbitration agreement exists between
the parties; (2) whether the disputed claim falls within the scope of the
arbitration agreement; and (3) whether the arbitration agreement expressly
exempts the particular dispute.93
85. E.g., Obstetrics and Gynocologists v. Pepper, 101 Nev. 105, 693 P.2d 1259
(1985). (The court refused to enforce an arbitration provision contained in a contract
of adhesion. The contract required patients to sign before receiving medical services
and contained no option for revocation.).
86. 676 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
87. TEX. Rev. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 238 (Vernon 1973).
88. Grissom, 676 S.W.2d at 711.
89. The court in I.U.B.A.C. Local Union No. 31 v. Anastasi Bros. Corp.,
600 F. Supp. 92 (S.D. Fla. 1984), explained that because the judiciary may not enforce
illegal contracts, courts are required to decide, sua sponte if necessary, the issue of
legality before enforcing a contract. It would therefore appear to be impossible to
waive the illegality defense since arbitration awards are subject to court suits for
contractual enforcement.
90. The UAA restricts when arbitrability may be addressed by the courts.
Courts may decide the issue of arbitrability when a party moves to compel or stay
arbitration. UAA § 2. Further, courts may rule on arbitrability when a motion to
vacate an award is made on the grounds that a valid arbitration agreement does not
exist. UAA § 12(a)(5).
91. See Connecticut Union of Tel. Workers v. Southern New England Tel.
Co., 148 Conn. 192, 197, 169 A.2d 646, 649 (1961).
92. E.g., Fryer v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 365 N.W.2d 249, 253 (Minn.
1985).
93. Federal Kemper Ins. Co. v. American Bankers Ins. Co., 137 Mich. App.
134, 357 N.W.2d 834 (1984); see also McCrary Eng'g Corp. v. Town of Upland, 472
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A. Scope of the Contract
In Federal Kemper Insurance Co. v. American Bankers Insurance Co.,94
the Michigan Court of Appeals decided the case on the principle that a court,
relying on the language of the contract, was to settle the issue of arbitra-
bility.95 According to the Federal Kemper opinion, a court is to consider (1)
whether an arbitration clause exists, (2) whether the disputed issue arguably
falls within the scope of arbitration, and (3) whether the disputed issue is
expressly excluded from arbitration by the contract.9
Federal Kemper involved an automobile accident in which a dispute arose
between the insured and her insurer regarding uninsured motorist coverage.
The insurer filed a declaratory action to determine its liability. The trial court
found in favor of the insurer despite the insured's claim that the issue should
have been submitted to arbitration pursuant to the insurance contract.9 7 The
court of appeals relied on the above stated test to affirm the trial court's
ruling that the dispute was not arbitrable. The court noted that the language
of the contract specifically excluded issues of coverage from arbitration.9"
Because this exclusion was found to be controlling, 99 the court of appeals
concluded that the contract language precluded arbitration.l°°
In a similar case, Clark v. Mutual Insurance Co., ° the defendant in-
surance company appealed from an order wherein it was forced to arbitrate
a dispute arising out of an uninsured motorist claim on a general automobile
liability insurance policy.10 2 The circuit court granted insured plaintiff's mo-
N.E.2d 1305 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (requiring a party seeking arbitration to prove the
existence of a valid arbitration agreement and a violation of that agreement).
94. 137 Mich. App. 134, 357 N.W.2d 834 (1984).
95. Id. at 139, 357 N.W.2d at 836-37.
96. Id. at 139-40, 357 N.W.2d at 837.
97. Id. at 139, 357 N.W.2d at 836.
98. The arbitration clause provided:
Arbitration. If any person making claim hereunder and the company do not
agree that such person is legally entitled to recover damages from the owner
or operator of the uninsured automobile because of bodily injury to the
insured, or do not agree to as the amount of payment which may be owing
under this insurance, then upon written demand of either, the matter or
matters, excluding matters of coverage, shall be settled by arbitration
Id. at 140, 357 N.W.2d at 837 (emphasis added).
99. Although the coverage exclusion was not contained in the original policy,
it was added by amendment nine years before the accident. The insurer introduced
an affidavit stating that the amendment was in effect at the time of the accident.
The appellate court accepted this unrefuted affidavit as "strong evidence" that the
coverage issue was beyond the scope of arbitration. Id. at 141, 357 N.W.2d at 837-
38.
100. Id. at 141, 357 N.W.2d at 837.
101. 131 Ill. App. 3d 633, 476 N.E.2d 4 (1985).
102. Id. at 635, 476 N.E.2d at 5.
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tion to compel arbitration of the coverage dispute and the insured sought to
have the arbitrator's award entered as a judgment.'0 3 The appeals court
reversed the trial court decision, and held that the insurance company had
not agreed to submit to arbitration the issue of coverage, and therefore it
should have been tried in court. 1 4 The court confirmed that the arbitration
agreement was valid, and noted if it is found in court that the plaintiff is
covered by the terms of the agreement, the arbitration process will be en-
forced to determine liability and damages.' °5
Since agreements to arbitrate are contracts, the scope of such agreements
are governed by the rules of contract interpretation. Furthermore, both leg-
islative and public policy require that any doubt in the scope of an agreement
to arbitrate be resolved in favor of arbitrability.' ° In Village of Cairo v.
Bodine Contracting Co., 10 7 the court of appeals set aside the trial court's
order enjoining arbitration and remanded for arbitration in accordance with
the agreement of the parties. 08 The plaintiff had contracted with defendant
for the installation of a comprehensive sewage system. The contract contained
an arbitration provision that included a clause stating that Bodine would
continue work in progress during any arbitration proceedings.' ° 9 Bodine failed
to do so. 110 Cairo, in support of its overall position denying arbitration,
claimed the clause should be construed as a condition precedent to the de-
mand for arbitration."' Conversely, Bodine maintained that at worst, the
work stoppage was a breach of contract, and, therefore, was a matter fit
for arbitration. 112
The court advanced several reasons for holding in favor of arbitrability.
First, owing to strong public policy, ambiguities should be construed in favor
of arbitration."' Second, even if work stoppage is construed as a breach of
the agreement to arbitrate, it does not necessarily follow that the other party
is excused from performing the contract: "A contract for arbitration, as any
other contract, may be breached, but not every breach excuses the other
party from the promise to arbitrate. .. ."I" Third, for a breach to revoke
the force of the agreement to submit to binding arbitration, the act of breach-
103. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10, para. 101 et seq. (1983).
104. Clark, 131 Ill. App. 3d at 637, 476 N.E.2d at 6.
105. Id. at 638, 476 N.E.2d at 7.
106. "[O]nce the existence of an agreement to arbitrate is proven-the clause
is construed in favor of the arbitrability of a dispute 'unless it may be said with
positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation
that covers the asserted dispute.' " Village of Cairo v. Bodine Contracting Co., 685
S.W.2d 253, 259 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
107. 685 S.W.2d 253 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
108. Id. at 266.
109. Id. at 259.
110. Id. at 260.
111. Id. at 261.
112. Id. at 259.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 260.
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ing must repudiate the arbitration agreement itself." 5 Finally, the perform-
ance of work could not be a condition precedent to arbitration because it
referred to a condition of activity during the arbitration process, not an act
prior to arbitration. 1
6
In State Highway Commission v. Brasel & Sims Construction Co.," 7 the
court focussed on contract language to determine whether the parties intended
to be bound by the arbitration clause.' 8 In this case the arbitration agreement
stated that disputes between the parties were to be decided by the state's
engineer. The engineer's determination was to be conclusive unless the parties
appealed. Because the agreement provided for an appeal, the court reasoned
that the parties did not intend to be bound by the arbitration." 9 A dissenting
opinion in the case argued that doubt as to the intent of the parties should
be resolved in favor of arbitrability.120 Nevertheless, the majority concluded
that in the absence of the requisite intent to be bound by the engineer's
decision, an enforceable dispute resolution clause did not exist.1
2
'
In Fryer v. National Union Fire Insurance Co. ,122 the Minnesota Supreme
Court reaffirmed the principle that arbitration should proceed when the ar-
bitrability issue is reasonably debatable.' 23 Following an automobile accident,
Fryer presented an uninsured motorist claim to his insurer after an unsuc-
cessful attempt to recover from the other driver's insurer. On the basis of
his insurance policy, Fryer sought arbitration of the issue of uninsured mo-
torist coverage. Five days before arbitration was to begin, the other driver's
insurer admitted coverage. Over the objection of Fryer's insurer, arbitration
proceeded and Fryer was awarded damages.124
On appeal from the denial of the insurer's motion to vacate the award,
the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the issue of uninsured motorist
coverage was reasonably debatable. 12 Thus, the court held the arbitrators
were within their authority in settling the dispute. 26
115. Id.
116. Id. at 261.
117. 688 P.2d 871 (Wyo. 1984).
118. Id. at 876.
119. Id. at 877.
120. Id. at 884 (Rooney, C.J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 877.
122. 365 N.W.2d 249 (Minn. 1985).
123. The court announced this principle in United States Fidelity and Guar.
Co. v. Fruchtman, 263 N.W.2d 66, 71 (Minn. 1978).
124. The arbitrators decided only the issues of liability and damages, leaving
the issue of coverage for later determination by the court. Fryer, 365 N.W.2d at 252.
125. The claimant's insurance policy defined an uninsured motor vehicle as,
among other things, (1) an automobile for which an insurer denies coverage or (2)
an "underinsured" automobile (i.e., a defendant's automobile for which insurance
coverage was less than the coverage of the claimant's policy). Id. at 252 n. 1. The
court held that although the eleventh-hour admission of coverage precluded uninsured
motorist coverage under the first definition, the automobile which struck claimant's
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It is a well established principle that parties are only bound to arbitrate
those issues which they have agreed to arbitrate. In United Food and Com-
mercial Worker International Union v. County Line Cheese Co.,127 the parties
negotiated and entered into a collective bargaining agreement containing an
arbitration clause. Throughout the negotiation process the employer refused
to adopt the Union's proposal for unionized trucking. Moreover, the written
contract was silent on the issue of trucking. The union sought to compel
arbitration of the trucking issue. However, the trial court granted the em-
ployer's motion for summary judgment on the basis that the issue was not
arbitrable. 28 On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling
finding that although the parties bargained with the issue in mind, the final
agreement was silent on the issue and the court would not infer a provision
covering the trucking issue. 2 9
A limited number of jurisdictions state that issues arising out of the law
of torts are not subject to written arbitration agreements. In Jim Halsey Co.,
Inc. v. Bonar,130 the Supreme Court of Arkansas rejected the defendant's
attempt to compel arbitration. The plaintiff, a concert promoter, had con-
tracted with defendant, a booking agent, for the performance of Rick Nelson.
A written agreement, containing an arbitration clause, was signed by plaintiff
but was not signed by either Rick Nelson or his agent. Subsequently, Rick
Nelson notified plaintiff that he would not perform as agreed, and plaintiff
brought suit alleging breach of an oral contract, negligence, and fraud. 3 , At
the trial, defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground that the
dispute was subject to arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause in the
written contract. 32
The court rejected this argument on two grounds: First, since plaintiff
had sued on the breach of an oral contract, which did not contain an ar-
bitration provision, and the written contract was unsigned, the arbitration
clause in the written contract was inapplicable; 3 and second, plaintiff's
petition alleged fraud and thus precluded the issue from being determined
by an arbitrator.3 4
Although some jurisdictions refuse to allow arbitration of tort claims,
others reason that arbitrability is not to be determined by characterizing the
claim as one of tort or contract. Instead, these latter jurisdictions focus on
the language in the arbitration clause in order to ascertain whether the clause
127. 469 N.E.2d 470 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984).
128. Id. at 471.
129. Id. at 473.
130. 284 Ark. 461, 683 S.W.2d 898 (1985).
131. Id. at 465, 683 S.W.2d at 902.
132. Id. at 472, 683 S.W.2d at 905.
133. Id. at 473, 683 S.W.2d at 906.
134. Id.; Arkansas' arbitration statute precludes written agreements to arbitrate
issues in the law of torts. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-511 (Supp. 1983).
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is sufficiently broad to include tort claims. This approach is in keeping with
the principle that arbitration agreements are contracts and the parties are
free to define for themselves the scope of the arbitration clause.
In Rodgers Builders, Inc. v. McQueen,'35 the parties entered into a writ-
ten contract for the construction of a multi-unit housing development. The
contract contained an arbitration clause which was very broad in scope.1
3 6
A dispute arose concerning plaintiff's alleged failure to complete the project
on time and defendant's refusal to pay a requested draw. Plaintiff demanded
arbitration of this dispute and an award was rendered in his favor. The
plaintiff then instituted an action in court alleging fraud, unfair and deceptive
trade practices, and praying for compensatory and punitive damages. 3 7 The
trial court granted summary judgment on the grounds that it was barred by
res judicata.'3 1 On appeal, plaintiff argued that he could not have brought
these claims to arbitration because they present questions in the law of torts
and also because he sought punitive damages.'3 9
In deciding in favor of arbitrability of these issues, the court considered
several factors. First, the court noted that there was no legislative bar to
arbitrating tort claims, provided that they are sufficiently related to the con-
tract or its breach.14' Second, the very broad language in the arbitration
clause was sufficiently broad to include any claim that arose out of or was
related to the contract or its breach, regardless of the characterization of the
claim as tort or contract.' 4
Where a contract provides a procedure, apart from arbitration, for the
settlement of certain disputed issues, the decision reached through that pro-
cedure is not arbitrable. In Hotel Employee and Restaurant Employees Union
v. Criterion Restaurant,42 a dispute over a proposed wage increase broke
out between the parties. Pursuant to the parties collective bargaining agree-
ment, a six-member committee considered the proposed increase. The com-
mittee granted the increase and the matter was then heard by an arbitrator.
The arbitrator found that absent a showing of bad faith, the committee's
135. 76 N.C. App. 16, 331 S.E.2d 726 (1985), review denied, 315 N.C. 590,
341 S.E.2d 29 (1986).
136. Id. at __ , 331 S.E,2d at 728. The arbitration clause provided in pertinent
part: "All claims, disputes and other matters in question between the Contractor and
the Owner arising out of, or relating to, the Contract Documents or the breach
thereof, . . . shall be decided by arbitration .... "Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at __, 331 S.E.2d at 730.
139. Id. at __, 331 S.E.2d at 731.
140. Id.; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.2(a) (1983), which provides that parties
"[M]ay include in a written contract a provision for the settlement by arbitration of
any controversy thereafter arising between them relating to such contract or the failure
or refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof." Id.
141. Rodgers, 76 N.C. App. at -, 331 S.E.2d at 731.
142. 352 N.W.2d 835 (Minn Ct. App. 1984).
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decision was not arbitrable.'" However, the court determined the arbitrator
had construed the committee procedure very narrowly,'" implying that a
decision from a broader or more loosely defined procedural agreement may
indeed be arbitrable.
B. Proper Forum
The question of whether an issue is arbitrable is one of law, and a court
must make its own determination on the issue. In Poire v. Kaplan,'4 one
joint venturer brought suit against another joint venturer. The defendant
filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the exclusive remedy was
arbitration. The court ordered the parties to arbitration and an award was
rendered for plaintiff. Defendant then claimed that the issues in her motion
to dismiss were not arbitrable. The court of appeals rejected defendant's
argument finding that the trial court had questioned the parties prior to
arbitration and concluded that the entire dispute was subject to arbitration.'46
In Metropolitan Dade County v. Resources Recovery Construction
Corp.,' on appeal from an order to stay arbitration, the Florida Court of
Appeals stated its test to determine which body should decide the issue of
arbitrability. If the party seeking a stay disputes the existence of an arbitra-
tion agreement, the court decides the issue.' 4 If the party acknowledges the
agreement, but denies it applicability due to events occurring since its adop-
tion, the arbitrator decides the issue. 149
In Dade County, the parties entered into contracts containing arbitration
agreements. An arbitrator, and later the parties themselves, revised the con-
tracts. The revised versions did not contain arbitration agreements. In a later
dispute, the parties disagreed whether or not they were required to submit
to arbitration. The trial court denied the county's motion to stay and sub-
mitted the issue of arbitrability to the arbitrators.10
Because the county disputed the existence of an arbitration agreement,
the court of appeals concluded that arbitrability should have been determined
by the court, not the arbitrator."' As a result, the court of appeals revesed
the lower court and remanded the action for further proceedings. 5 2
143. Id. at 836.
144. Id.
145. 491 A.2d 529 (D.C. 1985).
146. Id. at 533.
147. 462 So. 2d 570 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
148. Id. at 571 n.3.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 571.
151. Id. at 571 n.3.
152. The court ordered further proceedings to determine the parties' intent
with regard to arbitration in revising the contracts. The court noted that any decision
on arbitrability made before that determination would be premature. Id. at 571.
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In McCary Engineering Corp. v. Town of Upland,' the Indiana Court
of Appeals adhered to the principle that disputes concerning the existence of
an arbitration clause are to be settled by the court. 5 4 Furthermore, a party
seeking arbitration carries the burden of proving (1) the existence of a valid
arbitration clause and (2) a violation of that clause by the opposing party.'
In McCrary, the Town of Upland employed an engineering corporation
to prepare applications for federal grants. In a stack of forms requiring the
signature of the town board's president, the corporation inserted a contract
for additional services. Unknowingly, the president signed the forms and the
contract. The town attempted to terminate the contract because the president
had no authority to bind the town. In response, the corporation sought
arbitration in accordance with the terms of the contract. The trial court
granted a stay of arbitration.
On appeal, the court held that because the town questioned the authority
of the president, it disputed the validity of the contract and its arbitration
clause. 56 The appellate court concluded that the lower court had jurisdiction
to determine arbitrability and affirmed the lower court's stay of arbitration. '7
Where the language of an arbitration clause is unclear as to whether the
disputed issue falls within the scope of the arbitration clause, the question
of arbitrability should be left to the discretion of an arbitrator. In Howard
County Board of Education v. Howard County Education Association Inc., 58
the dispute focused on whether teacher observation reports were within the
scope of the parties' arbitration clause. The appellate court found the ar-
bitration clause ambiguous as to scope'19 and thus stated that the matter
should be submitted to an arbitrator who must determine the arbitrability
of the disputed issue.'60
In Board of County Commissioners v. Cam Construction Co. ,161 the
Maryland Court of Appeals ruled that arbitrators should decide whether
disputes fall within the scope of an arbtration clause. 62 In this case, the
153. 472 N.E.2d 1305 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).
154. The court found support for this principle in the first section of the
Indiana Arbitration Act, IND. CODE § 34-4-2-1 (1982); Great Am. Trading v. I.C.P.
Cocoa, Inc., 629 F.2d 1282, 1288 (7th Cir. 1980).
155. See Shahan v. Brinegar, 181 Ind. App. 39, 44, 390 N.E.2d 1036, 1040
(1979).
156. McCrary, 472 N.E.2d at 1307.
157. 472 N.E.2d at 1308.
158. 61 Md. App. 631, 487 A.2d 1220 (1985).
159. Id. at 643, 487 A.2d at 1226.
160. Id. "We are persuaded that when the language of an arbitration clause
is unclear as to whether the subject matter of the dispute falls within the scope of
the arbitration agreement, the legislative policy in favor of the enforcement of agree-
ments to arbitrate dictates that ordinarily the question of substantive arbitrability
initially should be left to the decision of the arbitrator." Id.
161. 300 Md. 643, 480 A.2d 795 (1984).
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Frederick County Commission entered into a construction contract with Cam
Construction Company. After the county refused Cam access to the con-
struction site, the contractor demanded arbitration in accordance with the
terms of the contract. The county sought an injuntion to restrain arbitration.
The parties disputed whether the contractor could seek arbitration for injuries
sustained by subcontractors.
On appeal from the trial court's denial of injunctive relief, the appellate
court concluded that the subcontractors' claims were not beyond the scope
of the arbitration clause.1 63 Thus, the court cleared the way for the arbitration
panel to decide whether or not the disputed claims were within the arbitration
clause. ,61
C. Arbitrability of Specific Claims
In Hall v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 65 a Florida appellate court
affirmed a trial court order compelling arbitration. It rejected the policy-
holder's contention that the claim was not arbitrable in that it violated pro-
visions of the Florida Insurance Code guaranteeing an insured a right of
access to the courts. The court explained that the statute relied upon by the
policyholder is applicable only to disability policies-not to life insurance
policies like that held by the plaintiff in the instant case.'"
IV. PROCEEDINGS To COMPEL OR STAY ARBITRATION
A. Compelling Arbitration
Arbitration agreements are statutorily recognized contracts and are sub-
ject to judicial enforcement by initiating a proceeding to compel arbitration.
Thus, an order to compel arbitration is analogous to an order for specific
performance. 67 Under the UAA, any party may compel arbitration by prov-
ing both an agreement to arbitrate and the opposing party's refusal to ar-
bitrate. 168
163. County Comm'r, 300 Md. at 649, 480 A.2d at 798.
164. Id. at 653, 480 A.2d at 800.
165. 454 So. 2d 711 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
166. Id. at 713.
167. Shaw v. Kuhnel & Assoc., 102 N.M. 607, -, 698 P.2d 880, 881 (1985).
168. UAA § 2(a) provides:
On application of a party showing an agreement described in Section 1 [an
arbitration agreement], and the opposing party's refusal to arbitrate, the
Court shall order the parties to proceed with arbitration, but if the opposing
party denies the existence of the agreement to arbitrate, the Court shall
proceed summarily to the determination of the issue so raised and shall order








A court's power to compel arbitration is determined by statute. 69 Ac-
cordingly, lack of jurisdiction may cause a court to deny a motion to compel
arbitration. For example, in Shaw v. Kuhnel and Associates, Inc.,' 70 a dental
group sued architects and contractors who designed and constructed their
dental offices. 171 The construction contracts contained provisions for arbi-
trating disputes that might arise between the parties. Upon commencement
of the action, the defendants moved to stay the court proceedings and compel
arbitration.Y2 The court denied the motions, finding the defendants were
Texas corporations, not licensed to do business in New Mexico. The court
reasoned that a motion to compel arbitration is in essence a suit for specific
performance of the arbitration agreement. 171 Although the court noted that
public policy would favor arbitration, New Mexico statutes specifically pro-
hibit any unauthorized foreign corporation from maintaining any suit or
proceeding. 74 Accordingly, the defendants were without power to compel
Shaw to arbitrate.
2. Statute of Limitations
Enforceability of an arbitration clause depends upon enforceability of
the contract with respect to the statute of limitation. In Adams v. Nelson, 75
the statute of limitations for pursuing an action for breach of contract was
three years. Over three years had passed between the time of the alleged
breach of the arbitration agreement and the time of suit to compel arbitra-
tion. 176 The court held that an action to compel arbitration following breach
of an arbitration agreement is subject to the same statute of limitations as
for breach of the underlying contract. '77 Therefore, since the statute of lim-
itations had run the plaintiff could not invoke an order to compel arbitration.
3. Party Determination
As a general rule, a court can only compel arbitration between the parties
to an arbitration agreement. 78 Occasionally, a party to a contract may wish
169. Detroit Auto Inter-Ins. Exch. v. Maurizo, 129 Mich. App. 166, 175, 341
N.W.2d 262, 265-66 (1983).
170. 102 N.M. 607, 698 P.2d 880 (1985).
171. Id. at -, 698 P.2d at 881.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-17-20 (A) (1983).
175. 313 N.C. 442, 329 S.E.2d 322 (1985).
176. Id. at , 329 S.E.2d at 325.
177. Id. at -, 329 S.E.2d at 325.
178. See UAA § 2(a).
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to enforce an arbitration agreement against a third-party beneficiary. Re-
cently, the Florida Court of Appeals held in Zac Smith & Co., Inc. v.
Moonspinner Condominium Association, Inc., 79 that where an arbitration
agreement is legally enforceable as to the parties to a contract, third-party
beneficiaries are bound to the same extent. 80
In this case a condominium association brought suit alleging defects in
the design and construction of a condominium. It claimed standing to bring
suit as a third-party beneficiary. The defendant sought to compel arbitration
pursuant to the arbitration clause within the contract. The court deemed the
condominium association bound to the arbitration clause because third-party
beneficiaries' rights are determined by contractual terms between the prom-
isor and the promisee.18 1
Similarly, in District Moving and Storage Co. v. Gardiner and Gardiner,
Inc. ,'182 the principle of third party beneficiary was used in granting a motion
to compel arbitration. In Gardiner, a lessee sued an architect and contractor
of his leased warehouse for alleged defects. 83 The trial court granted a motion
to compel arbitration.'8
The question whether third-party beneficiaries were bound by their ar-
bitration agreements was one of first impression in Maryland. 85 In affirming
the trial court, the appellate court held that the "District should not be
allowed to sue for breach of the contracts between [lessor and defendants]
and thus benefit from those agreements without equally being made to abide
by the terms... compelling arbitration of disputes.... ,,186
4. Contract Determination
Before a court can compel arbitration, it must determine whether the
parties are bound to the contract. If no valid agreement exists between the
parties, compelling arbitration is not proper., 87
In St. Luke's Hospital v. Midwest Mechanical Contractors, Inc., 18 Mid-
west was not awarded a construction contract even though it had been the
low bidder on the project. Consequently, Midwest attempted to utilize an
arbitration provision in the contract to compel arbitration. 8 9 St. Luke's sought
179. 472 So. 2d 1324 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
180. Id. at 1325.
181. Id.
182. 63 Md. App. 96, 492 A.2d 319 (1985).
183. Id. at 100, 492 A.2d at 321.
184. Id. at 101, 492 A.2d at 322.
185. Id. at 102, 492 A.2d at 322.
186. Id. at 104, 492 A.2d at 323.
187. Wamego v. L.R. Foy Constr. Co., Inc., 9 Kan. App. 2d 168, 675 P.2d
912 (1984).
188. 681 S.W.2d 482 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
189. Id. at 485.
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to stay threatened arbitration proceedings, contending that no arbitration
agreement existed between the parties. The trial court's grant of St. Luke's
motion to stay the arbitration was affirmed on appeal. The appellate court
said that the statutory scheme for compelling or staying arbitration proceed-
ings is premised upon the pre-existence of a valid agreement between the
parties. 19 Moreover, the appellate court held that upon a showing that no
valid agreement exists, the trial court may stay threatened arbitration pro-
ceedings. 191
Once a court determines that a valid contract exists, courts will not
characterize a dispute as one not in the contract. For example, in Anderson-
Parrish Associates, Inc. v. City of St. Petersburg Beach, 192 a contractor sued
the city for breach of a construction contract. The city brought Anderson-
Parrish, the architects, into the action by means of a third party complaint. 193
The city then attempted to avoid an arbitration agreement it had with An-
derson-Parrish by contending its claim was solely one of indemnification,
and not based on contract. The trial court denied Anderson-Parrish's motion
to compel arbitration. 94 The court reversed the denial on appeal, stating that
if there is no dispute an arbitration agreement exists, a motion to compel
arbitration must be granted. 9
The trial court denied a motion to stay arbitration in Grane v. Grane 96
Section 2(b) of the UAA provides a stay of arbitration if a dispute arises as
to the existence of an agreement to arbitrate. 9 In Grane, a claim of fraud
in the inducement was made,' 98 but the motion to stay was denied. 199 On
appeal, the court held that the stay should have been granted pending a
hearing to determine the existence of a valid arbitration agreement. 2°° Ac-
cordingly, a stay of arbitration proceedings is appropriate when there is an
issue concerning the validity of the arbitration agreement.
Similiarly, in Gulf Interstate Engineering Co. v. Pecos Pipeline and
Producing Co., 2°1 the court refused to enforce an arbitration clause which
was fraudulently induced. 2 2 A prior contract between the parties had not
190. Id. at 486.
191. Id. at 487.
192. 468 So. 2d 507 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
193. Id. at 508.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. 130 Ill. App. 3d 332, 473 N.E.2d 1366 (1985).
197. UAA § 2(b).
198. Grane, 130 Ill. App. 3d at 343, 473 N.E.2d at 1373 ("Fraud in the in-
ducement vitiates the contract and renders the agreement voidable at the option of
the injured party.").
199. Id. at 333, 473 N.E.2d at 1367.
200. Id. at 346, 473 N.E.2d at 1375.
201. 680 S.W.2d 879 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
202. Id. at 883.
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contained an arbitration clause. When the defendant signed the current con-
tract, he did so without consulting his attornery because a representative of
the plaintiff had represented to defendant that defendant's lawyer had ap-
proved the contract. Defendant's attorney had, in fact, never seen the current
contract which did include an arbitration clause.
5. Contract Interpretation
In Clark v. Country Mutual Insurance Co.,203 Clark sued his insurer
under an uninsured motorist policy. In addition, Clark sought arbitration of
the dispute pursuant to arbitration provisions within the policy.2°4 Country
Mutual adamantly denied any coverage under the policy.205 The motion to
compel arbitration was eventually granted, and a motion to reconsider sub-
mitted by Country Mutual was summarily dismissed. The appellate court
held that the trial court erroneously granted the motion to compel arbitra-
tion. 206 The court found the arbitration agreement to be limited in scope to
matters concerning liability of the uninsured motorist and not applicable to
policy coverage. The question of coverage was interpreted to present a thresh-
old question of law and fact which the trial court should have resolved. 2 °7
Accordingly, arbitration should not have been granted.
In LaCourse v. Firemen's Insurance Co. of Newark, N.J.,2 8 the appel-
late court held that under Pennsylvania law a party can stay arbitration
proceedings if it can establish that the arbitration agreement is limited in
scope and does not reach the issue in controversy. 209 The appellate court
reversed the trial court order compelling an insurance company to arbitrate
a dispute over "policy limits.1 210 It found that an agreement to arbitrate if
the parties disagreed on the "amount of damages" did not emcompass the
"policy limits" dispute. Therefore, there was no agreement to arbitrate the
issue and the court could not compel arbitration. 21 1
B. Staying Court Procedings
When the subject matter of a pending lawsuit involves an arbitrable
issue, a motion to compel arbitration is proper.212 If the motion is granted,
203. 131 Ill. App. 3d 633, 476 N.E.2d 4 (1985).




208. 756 F.2d 10 (3d Cir. 1985).
209. Id. at 12.
210. Id. at 14.
211. The court noted that Pennsylvania law generally favors arbitration but a
party cannot be compelled to arbitrate absent an agreement covering the disputed
issue. Id. at 12.
212. UAA § 2(a) (for text of § 2(a) see supra note 168).
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the court's order must include a stay of the court proceedings. 23 In Poire v.
Kaplan,2 4 the parties agreed to arbitrate after suit was filed. The trial court
stayed litigation and compelled arbitration pursuant to the parties' agreement.
On appeal, the stay was affirmed. 21 5 The court stated that "[i]f during the
course of litigation the parties agreed to arbitrate, a court may stay litigation
and order arbitration to proceed under 'rule of court.' "216
V. AWARDS
Six sections in the UAA specifically deal with awards. 1 7 These sections
provide a framework for the form of awards as well as other guidelines and
procedures concerning delivering, confirming, vacating, modifying or cor-
recting an award. 21 1 In applying the UAA to arbitral awards, recent cases
have dealt with (1) the grounds for attacking an award;2 1 9 (2) the effect of
an arbitrator's attempt to modify an award; 220 (3) the binding effect of an
award; 21 and (4) the reasons an arbitrator must give for his decision. 222
A. Grounds For Attacking Awards
The UAA recognizes five grounds for attacking an award, 223 the most
common of which is that the arbitrator exceeded his authority. 224 However,
even with the UAA's grounds for attacking an award, courts are hesitant to
overrule an award. 22 The arbitrator's decision is considered final on questions
213. UAA § 2(d) states:
Any action or proceeding involving an issue subject to arbitration shall be
stayed if an order for arbitration or an application therefore has been made
under this section or, if the issue is severable, the stay may be with respect
thereto only. When the application is made in such action or proceeding,
the order for arbitration shall include such stay.
214. 491 A.2d 529 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
215. Id. at 533.
216. Id.
217. UAA §§ 8, 9, 11-14.
218. Id.
219. See e.g., David A. Brooks Enter. v. First Sys. Agencies, 370 N.W.2d 434
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985); Grissom v. Greener & Sumner Constr. Co., 676 S.W.2d 709
(Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
220. See e.g., Local P-9 United Food v. George A. Hormel & Co., 599 F.
Supp. 319 (D. Minn. 1984), rev'd, 776 F.2d 1393 (8th Cir. 19).
221. See e.g., Western Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Gridley, 362 N.W.2d 100 (S.D.
1985).
222. See e.g., Board of Educ., Unified School Dist. No. 215 v. L.R. Foy
Constr. Co., 237 Kan 1, 697 P.2d 456 (1985).
223. UAA § 12(a) (for text of § 12 (a), see infra note 314).
224. See Recent Developments 1984, supra note 3, at 241.
225. See e.g., David A. Brooks Enter. v. First Sys. Agencies, 370 N.W.2d 434
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
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of law and fact in the absence of an agreement limiting his authority. 226
Accordingly, an aggrieved party will usually find it very difficult to obtain
judicial relief.
1. Jurisdiction
Arbitral power and authority to render awards has been significantly
limited in a jurisdictional sense, and it is the arbitration agreement that
defines the boundaries. The agreement sets out those issues that the parties
intend to arbitrate, and it is the agreement that effectively grants the arbi-
trator the jurisdiction to resolve certain enumerated issues.
In Grissom v. Greener & Sumner Construction Co.,227 the Texas Court
of Appeals upheld an arbitration award of exemplary damages for inde-
pendent tortious conduct in connection with a contractual dispute. 2 8 The
Texas Arbitration Act, which follows the UAA, provides for modification
of an award if the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to
them.2 29 The appellate court held, however, that the issue of exemplary dam-
ages (and their consequent effect upon attorneys' fees) had been expressly
submitted by the parties in the arbitration agreement. 230 Accordingly, the
award was upheld in the absence of any public policy grounds for modifying
the award.
2. Awards Inconsistent with Law
The UAA requires a court to vacate an award when the arbitrator ex-
ceeds his powers in making the award. 23 Courts differ on what is sufficient
to sustain a finding that an arbitrator exceeded his authority. Recent cases
indicate the following events which have been used to vacate awards on the
ground that the arbitrator exceeded his authority: (1) the award was based
on an egregious error of law or fact; 232 (2) the award was granted in manifest
disregard of the arbitration agreement; 33 or (3) the award contravened public
policy.
23 4
226. See Bingham County Comm'n v. Interstate Elec. Co., 105 Idaho 36, 41,
665 P.2d 1046, 1052 (1983).
227. 676 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
228, Id. at 711.
229. TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 238 § A(2) (Vernon 1973).
230. Grissom, 676 S.W.2d at 711.
231. UAA § 12 (3).
232. See e.g., David A. Brooks Enter. v. First Sys. Agencies, 370 N.W.2d 434
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
233. See e.g., Capozio v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 490 A.2d 611 (D.C.
Cir. 1985).
234. See e.g., Marino v. Tagaris, 395 Mass. 397, 480 N.E.2d 286 (1985).
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Generally, errors of law or fact will not justify setting aside an arbitra-
tor's award. In David A. Brooks Enterprises, Inc. v. First Systems Agen-
cies,235 the court stated that an arbitration award should not be set aside
simply because a court thinks that arbitrators erred as to the law or the
facts. 23 6 Brooks involved a dispute between a warehouse owner and his in-
surance company over the amount of fire damage to a warehouse. 2 7 The
issue was submitted to an appraisal umpire. The umpire entered an award
for the warehouse owner. 21
In reviewing this award, the Minnesota Court of Appeals first held that
the state arbitration statute governed the awards of appraisal umpires. 2 9 The
court then held an arbitration award could include prejudgment interest if
it had been contested as an item of damages despite the court's recognition
that awarding prejudgment interest is an error of law. 240 The court stated
that Minnesota's Arbitration Act emphasizes the need to uphold arbitration
awards even in the face of as mistake of law.24 1 Arbitration awards should
only be impeached if their conclusions are so at variance from conclusions
which might legitimately be drawn so as to imply bad faith or failure to
exercise honest judgment. 242
In Roseville Community District v. Federation of Teachers,243 the Mich-
igan Court of Appeals stated that a reviewing court is only to consider
whether the award draws its "essence" from the contract and is within the
authority of the arbitrator. 24 The arbitrator's interpretation of the contract
may be wrong.245 Roseville involved a collective bargaining dispute concerning
235. 370 N.W.2d 434 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
236. Id. at 436.
237. Id. at 435.
238. Id. at 434-35.
239. Id. at 435.
240. Id. The appraisal umpire made an error of law because awarding pre-
judgement interest is contrary to MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.09 (1982), which provides
in pertinent part: "When the judgment is for the recovery of money, . . . interest
from the time of the verdict or report until judgment is finally entered shall be
computed by the clerk as provided in this section and added to the judgment." Id.
(emphasis added).
241. Brooks, 370 N.W.2d at 436.
242. Id.
243. 137 Mich. App. 118, 357 N.W.2d 829 (1984).
244. Id. at 122, 357 N.W.2d at 832. The "essence" test was formulated by
the United States Supreme Court in the Steelworker's Trilogy. United Steelworkers
v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior
& Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg.
Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). The "essence test" states that "an arbitrator is confined
to interpretation and application of the ... agreement .... He may of course look
for guidance from many sources, yet his award is legitimate only so long as it draws
its essence from the ... agreement." United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597.
245. Roseville, 137 Mich. App. 118, 357 N.W.2d 829.
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the applicable seniority date in a conflict between a teacher and the school
district. 24 The school district argued that the arbitrator's decision determining
a senority date for a reinstated teacher was so unreasonable that it constituted
fraud. 27 The appellate court held that neither they nor the trial court stand
in the position to overturn an arbitrator's decision on the merits of a griev-
ance even if a mistake of fact exists. 248 Accordingly, the school district was
not permitted to end run this long standing principle by equating an unrea-
sonable mistake to fraud.249
In Fryer v. National Union Fire Insurance Co.,250 a policeman was in-
jured in an automobile accident while on duty.25' The policeman recovered
from National Union under their uninsured motorist policy. National Union
sought to reduce the award by the amount ot worker's compensation benefits
Fryer had received. 212 In upholding the award, the appellate court stated that
the arbitrator resolves all factual disputes and where the award is made for
the purpose of compensating a party for damage resulting from an auto-
mobile accident, the award need not be reduced by the amount of worker's
compensation benefits paid to the party. 253
In Capozio v. American Arbitration Association,25 4 a dispute arose be-
tween a homeowner and a contractor in which the homeowner attempted to
have an adverse award modified to reflect in the original contract price the
repair of three skylights. 255 The homeowner argued that any other intrepre-
tation of the contract was arbitrary. The appellate court upheld the award
finding that the arbitrator did not make an egregious factual error because
the original contract had been modified by a change order and the arbitrator's
award reflected this change. 25 6
When an arbitrator exceeds his power, thus invalidating one aspect of
the award, the entire award is not necessarily invalid. In School Committee
v. Holbrook Education Association, 2 7 the court held an award of damages
is sevarable from an arbitrator's invalid order for an employer to recall an
employee. 21
School Committee involved a dispute between a teacher and a school
committee. The teacher alleged the school committee had improperly hired
246. Id. at 119, 357 N.W.2d at 830, 831.
247. Id. at 126, 357 N.W.2d at 834.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. 365 N.W.2d 249 (Minn. 1985).
251. Id. at 251.
252. Id. at 255.
253. Id.
254. 490 A.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
255. Id. at 612.
256. Id. at 619.
257. 395 Mass. 651, 481 N.E.2d 484 (1985).
258. Id. at __, 481 N.E.2d at 489.
28
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1986, Iss.  [1986], Art. 13
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1986/iss/13
UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT
another person for a job for which the teacher was qualified. The teacher
had been laid off several months before the disputed hiring and, under the
terms of a labor agreement, had to be rehired before a job was offered to
a new teacher. The arbitrator ruled the committee had to recall the teacher
and awarded damages to the teacher. 2 9 The recall order was held invalid
because the arbitrator had exceeded his powers since the order interfered
with the management prerogative of the committee. However, the damage
award did not so interfere and thus was valid and sevarable from the recall
order .260
3. Awards Contravening Public Policy
An award may be vacated on the ground that the arbitrator exceeded
his autority because the award contravened public policy. In Marino v. Ta-
gari, 261 a fee dispute arose between an attorney and client. At the arbitration
hearing, the client represented herself. The arbitration board awarded the
attorney the full amount of the fees he claimed were due. The client appealed
on the ground that she had not been afforded a full and fair opportunity to
present her claims to the board, claiming that she did not understand the
nature of the proceedings and could not properly prepare for presentation
to the board. She claimed she had relied on a characterization of the pro-
ceedings as "informal" in an "arbitration guide" pamphlet which was fur-
nished to her before the session. She claimed to be further prejudiced by the
panel's refusal to allow her to respond to the attorney's presentation, alleg-
edly because they were "running behind schedule. '262
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts, while acknowledging a general
policy of judicial restraint in reviewing arbitration awards, held that the
arbitration board had failed to adequately inform the client of the nature of
the hearing and her right to challenge the award. Therefore, the board created
a risk that public confidence in the conduct of attorneys and the the fairness
of the judicial system would be undermined. 263 Given this important concern
of public policy, the court vacated the award. 264
In Caputo v. Allstate Ins. Co.,265 an arbitration award was held review-
able because it violated public policy. The plaintiff was injured when the car
he was driving collided with the car of a negligent uninsured motorist. The
arbitrators did not allow the plaintiff to "stack" uninsured motorist coverage
from three other vehicles owned by the plaintiff's father and insured by
259. Id. at __, 481 N.E.2d at 486.
260. Id. at , 481 N.E.2d at 488, 489.
261. 395 Mass. 397, 480 N.E.2d 286 (1985).
262. Id. at __, 480 N.E.2d at 288.
263. Id. at , 480 N.E.2d at 289.
264. Id. at __, 480 N.E.2d at 291.
265. 344 Pa. Super 1, 495 A.2d 959 (1984).
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Allstate.2" The plaintiff was covered by the insurance on one of his father's
cars, which he had been driving when the accident occurred. The arbitration
award was thus one-fourth what it would have been had Pennsylvania law
been applied. The court held that the public policy which favored compen-
sation of victims of uninsured motorists was strong enough to overcome the
traditional reluctance of courts to review arbitration awards.
267
B. Modification by Arbitrators
Section 13 of the UAA provides that, on application of a party or on
submission by the court, an arbitrator may modify an award if ther was a
miscalculation of figures or a mistake in the description of any person re-
ferred to in the award or if there was some other imperfection which does
not affect the merits of the controversy. 26 Since one goal of arbitration is
finality, that is, to provide an end to controversy and obviate the need for
litigation, 269 courts have held that the power of an arbitrator to modify an
award ceases when he has executed an award.270
For instance, in Local P-9, United Food v. George A. Hormel & Co.,27,
the court applied the principle of finality to invalidate an arbitrator's mod-
ification of an award. Specifically, the court held that an arbitrator's power
to modify an award ceased after execution of the award. 272 The case involved
a dispute between employees of a meat packing plant and Hormel concerning
266. Id. at 3, 495 A.2d at 960. "Stacking" of insurance coverage refers to the
practice of allowing overlapping, cumulative coverage of the same loss-event by two
or more policies owned by the same insured. The practice has been criticized as
allowing a "windfall" to the insured.
267. Caputo, 344 Pa. Super 5, 495 A.2d 961. Ironically, the actual award was
upheld on other grounds. Id. at-, 495 A.2d at 963 (insured vehicle had insufficient
contacts with Pennsylvania to apply that state's law which permitted stacking of
coverage).
268. Section 13 of the UAA provides for modification of an award:
(a) Upon application made within ninety days after delivery of a copy
of the award to the applicant, the court shall modify or correct the award
where:
(1) There was an evident miscalculation of figures or an evident mistake
in the description of any person, thing or property referred to in the award;
(2) The arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them
and the award may be corrected without affecting the merits of the decision
upon the issues submitted; or
(3) The award is imperfect in a matter of form, not affecting the merits
of the controversy....
Id.
269. Western Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Gridley, 362 N.W.2d 100 (S.D. 1985).
270. Local P-9, United Food v. George A. Hormel & Co., 599 F. Supp. 319
(D. Minn. 1984), rev'd, 776 F.2d 1393 (8th Cir. 1985).
271. Id.
272. Id. at 323.
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the applicability of a newly instituted work schedule. The arbitrator entered
an award favorable to the employees. Upon request by Hormel, the arbitrator
reconsidered the award. The arbitrator then entered an award favorable to
Hormel. The court held that the first award was final. When the award was
executed, the arbitrator's power ceased, and he had no authority to modify
the award.
273
The court based its decision on two grounds. The first was the doctrine
of functus officio, part of the federal common law of arbitration. The doc-
trine states that the authority of an arbitrator ceases when the award is
executed. 274 The court also relied on the Minnesota Arbitration Act. The act
contains only three grounds for modification, and none were applicable. 275
The court stated that the aim of the Minnesota act and the functus officio
doctring were consistent; to prevent an arbitrator from reconsidering the
merits of a dispute after he had entered an award.276
C. Binding Effect of an Award
As a general rule, an arbitrator's decision is binding upon the parties.
This rule serves its purpose by allowing minimal judicial interference in the
arbitration process. For example, in Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Gri-
dley,277 the South Dakota Supreme Court said an arbitration award is pre-
sumptively correct and not subject to modification unless one of the statutory
provisions is applicable. 27 In this case, both parties sought modification of
the award. The circuit court granted the motions to modify the award to
correct a mathematical error. 279 The supreme court held a further modifi-
cation was impossible because no statutory provision was applicable under
the facts of the case. That court stated the purpose of arbitration is the
resolution of disputes without resort to litigation. To allow the losing party
easy access to the courts would frustrate that purpose.2 8 0
In Cyclone Roofing Co. v. David M. LaFave Co. ,281 a party to the
arbitration challenged the circuit court's confirmation of the award and moved
for a modification based on alleged errors in the calculation of the arbitration
273. Id. at 320, 321.
274. Id. at 321-22.
275. Id. at 323-24. The applicable Minnesota statute, MINN. STAT. ANN. §
572.20 (West 1985), is identical to § 13 of the UAA (for text of § 13, see supra note
268.
276. Hormel, 599 F. Supp. at 324.
277. 362 N.W.2d 100 (S.D. 1985).
278. Id. at 102.
279. Id. at 101.
280. Id. at 102. The South Dakota statute, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-
25A-28 (1979) is identical to § 13 of the UAA (for text of § 13, see supra note 268).
281. 312 N.C. 224, 321 S.E.2d 872 (1984).
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award. 2 2 The court denied the motion finding no errors nor other statutory
grounds for modification. The court held the statutory grounds for modi-
fication of an award were exclusive. 28 3
A set-off judgment is not an improper modification of an arbitration
award. 2 4 The court in Adam Martin Construction Co. v. Brandon Partner-
ship,25 stated a set-off judgment was a proper modification because the
award was not disturbed, and the substantive rights of the parties were not
affected. An arbitrator has no power to implement an award; this action is
a function of the courts. It is from their inherent authority to enforce judg-
ments that the courts derive the power to order a set-off.2 6 The award in
question was rendered in a dispute involving a mechanics lien foreclosure
action. The circuit court confirmed the respective awards to Martin and
Brandon and then ordered the lesser award against Martin set off against
Brandon's award. The court of appeals affirmed.
28 7
D. Reason for A wards
Section 8 of the UAA does not require arbitrators to give reasons for
their awards. 288 Nonetheless, awards have been attacked as being vague in
that the arbitrators failed to specify their reasons justifying the award or
specifically address each assertion of the parties. For example, in Board of
Education, Unified School District No. 215 v. L.R. Foy Construction Co.,289
an arbitrator's award was attacked as being void for vagueness in that the
arbitrator failed to specifically address each contention raised by the parties
when making the findings and award. The court upheld the award, holding
that although it was not detailed, the award was not vague and was a proper
attempt to resolve all the issues between the parties. 290 The court also held
that a party's application for clarification of an award operated as an ac-
knowledgment of the award's validity and the arbitrator's jurisdiction. 291
282. Id. at 227, 235, 321 S.E.2d at 875, 880.
283. Id. at 234, 321 S.E.2d at 880. The North Carolina statute dealing with
modification, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.14(b) (1983), is identical to § 13 of the UAA
(for text of § 13, see supra note 268).
284. Adam Martin Constr. Co. v. Bradon Partnership, 135 Il. App. 3d 324,
481 N.E.2d 962, 964 (1985).
285. Id. at ,481 N.E.2d at 962.
286. Id. at ,481 N.E.2d at 964.
287. Id. at _ , 481 N.E.2d at 963-64.
288. UAA § 8.
289. 237 Kan. 1, 697 P.2d 456 (1985).
290. Id. at 2-3, 697 P.2d at 457.
291. Id. at 4, 697 P.2d at 458.
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VI. CONFIRMATION AND VACATION OF AWARDS
A. Confirmation
Section 11 of the UAA provides that a court shall confirm an arbitration
award unless grounds are urged for vacating, modifying, or correcting the
award. 292 Moreover, a motion to vacate an award must be made within ninety
days of the applicant's receipt of the award.2 93
A court will not confirm an arbitration award if the arbitrator exceeded
his authority, however, a court will not review an arbitration proceeding on
the merits. 29 In Poire v. Kaplan, 295 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
affirmed a superior court decision confirming an arbitration award and stated
that an order of confirmation is an appealable decision. 296 On March 30,
1983, the arbitrator issued the award. Appellant filed his motion to reconsider
on April 25, 1984.297 Appellant's motion to reconsider was made more than
ninety days after delivery of a copy of the award to the movant. The motion
was therefore untimely, and the court found no error in the trial court's
denial of the motion for reconsideration. 298
The court also stated that since the arbitrator ruled only on the relevant
arbitration clauses, he did not exceed his authority, and the lower court
properly confirmed the award. 299 The arbitrator's failure to spell out his
interpretation of the agreement in question did not make his award invalid. 3°°
The court also stated that it would not review an award on the merits.301
State v. Davidson and Jones Construction Co. 30 2 dealt with a motion to
vacate granted by the trial court. The court of appeals stated that when a
motion to vacate is granted, a motion to confirm is rendered moot. 303 The
court supported this decision through an analysis of the relevant North Car-
olina statutes. 314 A court can modify an award and confirm it, or join an
292. UAA § 11 states: "Upon application of a party, the Court shall confirm
an award, unless within the time limits herinafter imposed grounds are urged for
vacating or modifying or correcting the award, in which case the court shall proceed
as provided in Sections 12 and 13."
293. UAA § 12(b).
294. E.g., Poire v. Kaplan, 491 A.2d 529, 533-34 (D.C. 1985).
295. 491 A.2d 529.
296. Id. at 531 n.1; UAA § 19 (a)(3).
297. Poire, 491 A.2d at 532.
298. Id. at 534.
299. Id. at 533-34.
300. Id. at 534.
301. Id.
302. 72 N.C. App. 149, 323 S.E.2d 466 (1984).
303. Id. at -, 323 S.E.2d at 469.
304. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.13 (1983); see also UAA § 12(d).
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application to confirm with an application to correct or modify.3 °5 "The
vacating of an arbitration award does not deny a motion to confirm, but
renders the consideration of an application to confirm moot."
3 °0
In Adam Martin Construction Co. v. Brandon Partnership,0 7 an Illinois
appellate court held that a court imposed set-off of an arbitration award is
a confirmation rather than a modification of an award. An arbitrator had
issued awards to both parties in the arbitration proceeding. The trial court,
in confirming the awards, ordered a set-off. The plaintiff contended the set-
off was a modification which was impermissible because neither party had
"urged" a modification pursuant to the Illinois statute patterned after section
11 of the UAA.3 08 The state appellate court rejected the argument explaining
that the amounts awarded to the parties were not disturbed and were there-
fore confirmed. 1 9 The appellate court noted that the trial court could order
a set-off in its discretion because the arbitration act 310 provides that a court
confirming an arbitration award should enforce it as any other judgment or
decree."t'
In Hall v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co."'2 a Florida appellate court
reversed a trial court order confirming an arbitration award because the
arbitrator did not provide a definitive answer to the question in controversy.
The appellate court held that the trial court's confirmation of the arbitrator's
decision lacked adequate foundation because the physician failed to offer a
definite opinion whether the claimant's injury prevented her from engaging
in gainful employment as required by the arbitration agreement.3"3
B. Vacation
A party to an arbitration agreement may apply for a court order to have
an award vacated. Section 12 of the UAA sets out five grounds upon which
such vacation shall be made. 14 This section also specifies procedure which
305. N.C. GEN. STAT. 1-567.14(b)-(c) (1983); see also UAA § 13(b)-(c).
306. Davidson, 72 N.C. App. at 149, 323 S.E.2d at 469.
307. 135 I11. App. 3d 324, 481 N.E.2d 962 (1985).
308. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10, § Ill (1975).
309. Adam Martin, 135 111. App. 3d at -, 481 N.E.2d at 964.
310. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10, § 114 (1975) ("Upon the granting of an order
confirming, modifying or correcting an award, judgment shall be entered in con-
formity therewith and shall be enforced as any other judgment.").
311. Adam Martin, 135 I11. App. 3d at -, 481 N.E.2d at 964.
312. 454 So. 2d 711 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
313. Id. at 713.
314. UAA § 12(a) states:
(a) Upon application of a party, the court shall vacate an award where:
(1) The award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means;
(2) There was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral
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must be followed by both the movant3"5 and the court 1 6 in the vacation
process. Since courts are conscious of the fact arbitration is a tool designed
to avoid formal litigation, judicial review of arbitration is circumscribed.31 7
Courts do, however, review arbitration upon the timely filing of a motion
to vacate. Courts generally hold that an arbitration award can be vacated
only on the grounds specifically set forth in the UAA.
1. Fraud
In Beebout v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.,18 the court noted
the trial court's reason for vacating the arbitration award was because "the
appraiser so completely failed to adequately arrive at the losses sustained by
the plaintiff that it must be viewed in the same light as though fraud had in
fact been perpetrated." 31 9 The court stated "[w]hen such is the circumstance,
the appraiser's award must be vacated. 3 20
(3) The arbitrators exceeded their powers;
(4) The arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause
being shown therefore or refused to hear evidence material to the controversy
or otherwise so conducted the hearing, contrary to the provisions of Section
5, as to prejudice substantially the rights of a party; or(5) There was no arbitration agreement and the issue was not adversely
determined in proceedings under Section 2 and the party did not participate
in the arbitration hearing without raising the objection; but the fact that the
relief was such that it could not or would not be granted by a court of law
or equity is not ground for vacating or refusing to confirm the award.
Id.
315. UAA § 12(b) states:
An application under this Section shall be made within ninety days after
delivery of a copy of the award to the applicant, except that, if predicated
upon corruption, fraud or other undue means, it shall be made within ninety
days after such grounds are known or should have been known.
Id.
316. UAA § 12(c) states:
In vacating the award on grounds other than stated in clause (5) of Sub-
section (a) the court may order a rehearing before new arbitrators are chosen
as provided in the agreement, or in the absence thereof, by the court in
accordance with Section 3, or if the award is vacated on grounds set forth
in clauses (3) and (4) of Subsection (a) the court may order a rehearing
before the arbitrators who made the award or their successors appointed in
accordance with Section 3. The time within which the agreement requires
the award to be made is applicable to the rehearing and commences from
the date of the order.
Id. See also UAA § 12(d) ("If the application to vacate is denied and no motion to
modify or correct the award is pending, the court shall confirm the award.").
317. Caputo v. All State Ins. Co., 344 Pa. Super. 1, , 495 A.2d at 959, 960
(1984) (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Fioravanti, 451 Pa. 106, 114 n.4, 299 A.2d 585,
589 n.4 (1973)).
318. 365 N.W.2d 271 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
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The reviewing court concluded there was nothing in the record to support
an inference of fraud, and that the mere allegation of inadequacy of an
award, because of a different computation, was insufficient to sustain the
theory. a21 The finding of a lack of sufficient proof because of mere allegation
of fraud has been a common thread in the denial of motions to vacate in
recent cases.
22
2. Bias or Misconduct
In AFSCME Council 65 v. Aitkin County,3 23 a county employee filed a
written grievance pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement between the
County and a bargaining unit (hereinafter "AFSCME"). The agreement pro-
vided for binding arbitration of grievances.3 2
4
The appellate court, in setting aside the vacation stated, "[tihe trial
court's decision was clearly a judgment on the merits and thus invaded the
jurisdiction of the arbitrator.' '325 The appellate court found the arbitrator
had properly considered the issue in question and had not conducted the
hearing so as to substantially prejudice the County's rights. 326 The court
concluded that the issue in question, which was cited in the written grievance,
was properly before the arbitrator and the County should have been pre-
pared.3 27 The court justified this decision by stating "[ijf the County was
unprepared, it could have requested a recess, a continuance, another hearing
or clarification of the award. 3 2
Likewise, the plaintiff in Beebout argued the award should be vacated
because of misconduct prejudicing its rights.32 There, an insurance company
had contacted the neutral umpire. 3 0 The court held that the trial court erred
321. Id. at 274.
322. See, e.g., Metropolitan Dade County v. Molloy, 456 So. 2d 1280, 1281
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (per curiam) (record devoid of any showing of prejudice);
Roseville Community School Dist. v. Roseville Fed'n of Teachers, 137 Mich. App.
118, 126, 357 N.W.2d 829, 834 (1984) (plaintiffs claim that the arbitration decision
was so unreasonable that it constituted fraud was dismissed because it represented
nothing more than a "thinly veiled attack on the decision itself"); Cyclone Roofing
Co. v. David M. LaFave Co., 312 N.C. 224, 235-36, 321 S.E.2d 872, 879-80 (1984)
(record void of evidence of grounds on which to vacate based on the theory that the
arbitrator exceeded his power, not directly alleged by a claim of incorrect calculation
of the award, and no evidence of prejudice).
323. 357 N.W.2d 432, 434 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
324. Id.
325. Id. at 436.
326. Id. at 435; see, MWN. STAT. § 572.19.1(4) (1984).
327. AFSCME, 357 N.W.2d at 436.
328. Id.
329. Beebout v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 365 N.W.2d at 271, 274
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in vacating the arbitration award noting, "[iln other cases contacts with a
neutral umpire might justify an inference of undue means, but here they do
not." 33' In its conclusion, the court in Beebout stated the trial court had not
only erred in vacating the award, but had also erred in ordering a new trial.33 2
The court noted that the UAA does not provide the authority for a trial
court to order a jury trial on any issue. 333
In Burd, Inc. v. Stoneville Furniture Co.,334 the appellent argued he was
prejudiced because he believed the right to arbitration had been waived upon
the appellee's filing suit and, therefore, did not brief the merits of the case
pending before the arbitrator. 335 The court found while both disputes derived
from the same original agreement, the disputes involved separate claims.3 36
The court concluded the appellant's argument was contrary to the policy that
arbitration was designed to achieve. 3 7 Also, the court noted the arbitrator
had addressed the merits in his decision. 38
In a very abbreviated opinion, the court in Metropolitan Dade County
v. Molloy339 reviewed the vacation of an award which was originally granted
in a dispute between an employee and his employer over salary level and
employee classification. The court found the record devoid of any showing
by the employee of prejudice to satisfy the statutory requirement concerning
prejudice, 34 ° and therefore reversed the decision of the trial court.3 41
Although stating the appeal should be dismissed for mootness, the court
in State v. Davidson & Jones Construction Co.,342 reviewed the trial court
finding of arbitrator misconduct. The arbitrator had requested an article from
the plaintiff, which was written by his expert.34 3 The other party was not
notified of the request. 3" The court held, "[a]lthough we do not believe that
this is the best or preferred manner for an arbitrator to receive evidence, we
hold that it is not enough to vacate the award. ' 341
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id.; UAA § 12(c) allows the court to order rehearings in certain situations.
334. 134 Ill. App. 3d 149, 479 N.E.2d 962, (1985).
335. Id. at , 479 N.E.2d at 965.
336. Id. at , 479 N.E.2d at 964.
337. Id. at __, 479 N.E.2d at 965-66. (The court stated that arbitration was
designed to achieve a final disposition of disputes in a more expeditious and inex-
pensive manner than litigation.).
338. Id. at -, 479 N.E.2d at 966.
339. 456 So. 2d 1280, 1281 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (per curiam).
340. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 682.13(1)(d) (1981).
341. Metropolitan Dade County, 456 So. 2d at 1281.
342. 72 N.C. App. 149, 323 S.E.2d 466 (1984).
343. Id. at 149, 323 S.E.2d at 469.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 149, 323 S.E.2d at 470.
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3. Exceeding the Arbitrator's Powers
In Fryer v. National Union Fire Insurance Co.,346 the issue on appeal
was whether there was a claim to arbitrate. The court held when a liability
carrier denies coverage but subsequently admits coverage prior to the arbi-
tration hearing, there was no claim to present to the arbitration panel, and,
therefore, the panel had exceeded its powers. 4 7 The court, however, con-
cluded the dispute involved not only coverage but also underinsurance, and
therefore, the arbitration panel did not exceed its power in deciding the
claim. 341
In Burd, Inc. v. Stoneville Furniture Co.,349 the appellant argued that
the arbitrator had exceeded his statutory powers by failing to address the
question of jurisdiction and that the arbitration award should, therefore, be
vacated.350 The court stated that the appellee's actions in filing suit "did not
constitute a waiver of arbitration" and did not rob the arbitration proceeding
of its jurisdictional basis.3 51 Accordingly, the court held that the arbitrator
did not exceed his powers by "implicitly" reaching the correct result. 5 2 In
reaching this conclusion, the court cited authority for the proposition that
the appellant has the burden to prove the arbitrator exceeded his powers by
"clear, strong, and convincing evidence," which the appellant had not done.353
In Prince George County Educator's Association v. Board of Educa-
tion,354 the court reversed a trial court which had refused to vacate an award
in favor of the Board of Education. The court found that the arbiter's finding
that a driver's education program instructor was not included in a collective
bargaining agreement was "clearly erroneous and makes that award com-
pletely irrational." 5 5 The court found its authority to vacate the award,
because of the error of fact, in the language of the UAA: first, that a
completely irrational award would have to be reached by "undue means,"
and secondly, that the arbitrator had exceeded his authority by making a
clearly erroneous finding of fact.1
6
In upholding an arbitrator's award against several challenges by the city,
a Massachusetts appellate court applied a fundamentally different approach
346. .365 N.W.2d 249 (Minn. 1985).
347. Id. at 254; see MINN. STAT. § 572.19.1(30) (Supp. 1985).
348. Fryer, 365 N.W.2d at 254.
349. 134 Ill. App. 3d 149, 479 N.E.2d 962 (1985).
350. Id. at -, 479 N.E.2d at 965; ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 10, § 112 (1985).
351. Burd, 134 11. App. 3d at - , 479 N.E.2d at 965.
352. Id. at , 479 N.E.2d at 965.
353. Id. at __, 479 N.E.2d at 965.
354. 61 Md. App. 249, 486 A.2d 228 (1985), cert. granted, Md. 114, 492 A.2d
616 (1985).
355. Id. at 256, 486 A.2d at 232.
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in City of Worchester v. Granger Brothers, Inc.35 7 The starting point in the
court's analysis was the rule that "an award made within the scope of the
submission is not made invalid by a mistake of the arbitrator as to law or
fact.""35 The city's petition for vacation alleged that the arbitrator had ex-
ceeded his authority in finding that an engineering firm consulted by a con-
tracter, but not a party to the contract from which the arbitration arose,
was not responsible to the city for problems encountered in the construction
of a civic center. The court refused to vacate the award because it found
that the arbiter could have reasonably found the engineering firm to be an
agent of the party to the contract and thus within the terms of the sub-
mission.35 9 The court also refused to vacate the award on grounds that the
arbiter had misconstrued the contract in awarding a second contractor in-
demnification by the city. The city also brought a claim that the award was
base upon isufficient evidence, a ground the appellate court deemed improper
for review in arbitration cases.' °
In Duluth Police Union v. City of Duluth,3 61 the court affirmed the trial
court's ruling that an arbiter had not exceeded his powers within the meaning
of the Minnesota Arbitration Act.3 62 The city sought vacation on the grounds
that the arbiter had gone outside the scope of the submission by considering
provisions of the the police manual and past department practices to reach
his conclusion that the city had reassigned a senior officer in violation of
the collective bargaining agreement.3 63 The court quoted prior statements of
state policy that include as proper instruments of labor arbitration past prac-
tices of the parties and of the idustry so that the arbitrator may "ascertain
the parties' intended standard of behavior." 364
4. Miscellaneous
The cases referred to in this section did not utilize one of the five specific
grounds listed in Section 12 of the UAA as the main tool of analysis. The
cases are included to show the analytical processes courts have followed in
dealing with a diverse set of questions and problems encountered under the
vacation provision.
357. 19 Mass. App. 379, 474 N.E.2d 1151 (1985), further appellate review
denied, 394 Mass. 1103, 477 N.E.2d 595 (1985).
358. Id. at -, 474 N.E.2d at 1155 (citing Jordan Marsh Co. v. Beth Israel
Hosp. Ass'n., 331 Mass. 177, 186, 118 N.E.2d 79 (1954) (quoting from Phanuef v.
Corey, 190 Mass. 237, 246-47, 76 N.E. 718, (1906)).
359. Id. at , 474 N.E.2d at 1155.
360. Id. at , 474 N.E.2d at 1156. The statute discussed is G.L.C. 150c §
11.
361. 360 N.W.2d 367 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
362. MINN. STAT. § 572.19, subd. 1(3) (1982).
363. Duluth Police, 360 N.W.2d at 369.
364. Id. at 370.
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Caputo v. Allstate Insurance Co. 361 involved plaintiff's efforts to set
aside, vacate or modify an award which had been granted to the plaintiff
for uninsured motorist benefits from a motor vehicle accident.3 "6 The court
did not find the arbitration award reviewable on specific statutory grounds,
but allowed review based on an alleged violation of public policy. 367 After
an analysis of the applicable state law, the court confirmed the award. 36
In arguing that an arbitration award concerning a fee dispute with her
attorney should be vacated, the plaintiff in Marino v. Tagaris369 listed two
reasons to vacate the award: (1) There was no "meeting of the minds" on
the agreement to arbitrate, and (2) deprivation of property without due proc-
ess of law.3 0
The court did not reach the issue of due process and based its decision
on the insufficient advice and material given to the client by the arbitration
board staff concerning the nature of the proceedings and her rights to chal-
lenge the award. 371 The material given to the plaintiff included a guide and
a set of rules, neither of which explicitly referred to rights available by
Massachusetts statute372 concerning vacating, modifying or correcting the ar-
bitration award. 373
The court stated, "[Tihe board's rules and guide did not adequately
inform the client of the nature of the hearing or of the right to challenge
the award. 3 74 The court said this procedure creates a risk that public con-
fidence in the conduct of attorneys and the fairness of the judicial system
may be undermined.3 75 The court noted that, although self representation is
encouraged in arbitration proceedings, in practice this can be unfair if a
client is not given adequate advance information about the hearing.3 76 The
court noted, moreover, that the guide furnished by the board prompted the
client's belief she could adequately represent herself because the proceedings
were labeled "informal. ' 377 The court noted either ground claimed by the
client would be adequate, if proven, to vacate the award.378
365. 344 Pa. Super. -, 495 A.2d 959 (1985).
366. Id. at _, 495 A.2d at 959.
367. Id. at __,495 A.2d at 959.
368. Id. at _, 495 A.2d at 959.
369. 395 Mass. 397, 480 N.E.2d 286 (1985).
370. Id. at , 480 N.E.2d at 287.
371. Id. at , 480 N.E.2d at 287.
372. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 251, §§ 9, 12-13 (Supp. 1985). Under the
statute, an application to vacate must be made within thirty days.
373. Marino, 395 Mass. at _ , 480 N.E.2d at 288.
374. Id. at , 480 N.E.2d at 289.
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. Id. at _, 480 N.E.2d at 290.
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Capozio was granted an extension of proceedings in the initial stages of
arbitration in Capozio v. American Arbitration Association .31 9 A second such
extension, however, was denied. 380 The hearing, which counsel for Capozio
stated they would not participate in, was held ex parte and an award was
set.381 Capozio, represented by new counsel, filed a motion to vacate, which
was denied and later appealed. 3 2
The first question considered by the appellate court was whether Capozio
had actually presented a motion for an extension of time for the hearing to
the arbitration authority, and if so, "whether she presented sufficient 'good
cause' " for the extension. 3 3 The court noted the applicable law covered only
refusals to postpone preliminary proceedings leading up to the hearing.
3 4
Regardless of this fact, the court found Capozio's request presented insuf-
ficient good cause for the extension. 3 5 Similarly, the court found insufficient
good cause shown in the motion to vacate the notice of the hearing. 3 6 The
motion was based on unproven contentions, undefined reasons, and merely
inferred prejudicial conversations without proof.3 7
The court further stated that the movant's next argument for vacation,
the ex parte nature of the hearing, was without merit because the rules of
the association allow arbitration to proceed in the absence of a party who,
after notice, failed to be present. 388 The appellate court also stated the actions
of the trial court in forwarding a letter to the arbitrator did not violate the
association's rules. 389
Grissom v. Greener & Sumner Construction, Inc. 390 involved an appeal
from a lower court's modification of an arbitration award. The appellate
court noted the trial court could only properly review the award if fraud,
mistake, or misconduct were alleged because the parties had expressly waived
their rights to appeal in the arbitration agreement. 391 Two such conditions
were alleged in Grissom: (1) partiality, and (2) prejudice. 392 The court found
no evidence to warrant vacating the award on either ground.3 93 The appellate
379. 490 A.2d 611, 613 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
380. Id.
381. Id. at 613-14.
382. Id. at 614.
383. Id. at 615; see D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-4311(a)(4) (1981).
384. Capozio, 490 A.2d at 615.
385. Id.
386. Id. at 616-17.
387. Id. at 614, 616-17.
388. Id. at 618; see American Arbitration Association Rule 30.
389. Capozio, 490 A.2d at 618-19; see American Arbitration Association Rule
40. This rule prohibits a party from communicating with an arbitrator absent notice
to the other party and an opportunity to respond.
390. 676 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984).
391. Id. at 710.
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court found error in the trial court's modification of the arbitration award
because the lower court utilized legal principles to conclude the award was
improper.3 94
Daniels Insurance Agency, Inc. v. Jordan3'9 involved an arbitration award
which had been granted to a former employee in an action based on a
covenant not to compete.3 96 The employer moved to vacate alleging action
in excess of power and partiality.3 91 The award was affirmed in the district
court but reversed on appeal. 39 The reversal included a directive to the lower
court to "enter a new judgment or to order a new arbitration hearing." 3 99
After the lower court held that the new hearing involved a default judgment,
the appellate court remanded for a second time to the lower court to deter-
mine if the first award should be vacated, stating the default judgment was
*a violation of constitutional due process.0 The dissenting judge argued the
hearing was ineffectual because the trial court had not followed the proce-
dures agreed upon by the parties in securing a second arbitration hearing .40'
In Roseville Community School District v. Roseville Federation of
Teachers ,4 2 the school district challenged an award granted to a teacher
involving seniority.43 The district argued for vacation on jurisdictional grounds
and conduct of the arbitrator. 404
The appellate court agreed with the trial court's decision to grant sum-
mary judgment to the teacher stating this was outside the purview of judicial
review because it involved interpreting the parties' agreement, and the court
could not substitute its judgment for that of the arbitrator. 4 5 The court also
dismissed the plaintiff's second jurisdictional claim that the award wasn't
issued in a timely manner, stating the limits for filing are discretionary and
not mandatory. 406
Because of the policies inherent in arbitration, courts are reluctant to
interfere with the decision of the arbitration panel. The courts do not hesitate,
394. Id. at 711; see TEX. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 237, § A(5) (Vernon 1973)
("[Tihe fact that the relief was such that it could or would not be granted by a court
of law or equity is not ground for vacating or refusing the award.").
395. 102 N.M. 162, 692 P.2d 1311 (1984).




400. Id. at , 692 P.2d at 1313. The appellate court determined sufficient
notice had not been given pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 55(b). Id.
401. Daniels, 102 N.M. at 162, 692 P.2d at 1311 (Walters, J., dissenting).
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 44-7-12(c) (1978) provides that when a court vacates an arbitration
award because an arbitrator exhibited partiality, it may set the matter for a new
arbitration as provided by the agreement (emphasis original).
402. 137 Mich. App. 118, 357 N.W.2d 829 (1984).
403. Id. at 120, 357 N.W.2d at 831.
404. Id. at 125-26, 357 N.W.2d at 833-34.
405. Id. at 124, 357 N.W.2d at 833.
406. Id. at 126, 357 N.W.2d at 833.
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however, to review decisions which were allegedly procured by fraud; a prod-
uct of arbitrator misconduct or partiality; a result of powers extended beyond
proper boundaries; or for various other reasons as shown by cases in this
section.
Realizing that arbitration is designed to avoid the courtroom, judges
will not review the decision of the panel merely based upon allegations of
impropriety. Courts do, however, strive to protect an innocent party, espe-
cially one who was unrepresented or received incorrect, inaccurate, or mis-
leading information about the proceedings, from inequities in decisionmaking.
VII. APPEALS
The UAA provides the right to appeal arbitration decisions under certain
circumstances.4 7 Section 19 of the UAA lists the appropriate circumstances
for appeal when a trial court has rendered a decision regarding an arbitration
proceeding and one party wishes to appeal this decision./° Some jurisdictions
compare this process to the granting or denying of injunctions and effectively
ignore the UAA.4 9 Many jurisdictions, however, have adopted the UAA and
strictly follow it, even when contrary to earlier case law. 41 0
Cases dealing with section 19 of the UAA consistently rely on the same
core of underlying principles. When a court is favorable to the UAA's appeal
provision, it will typically cite policy reasons such as the avoidance of un-
necessary interlocutory appeals and the resulting delay, 41' availability of ap-
407. UAA § 19 states:
(a) An appeal may be taken from:
(1) an order denying an application to compel arbitration made under
Section 2;
(2) an order granting an application to stay arbitration made under
Section 2(b);
(3) an order confirming or denying confirmation of an award;
(4) an order modifying or correcting an award;
(5) an order vacating an award without directing a rehearing; or
(6) a judgment or decree entered pursuant to the provisions of this act.
(b) The appeal shall be taken in the manner and to the same extent as from
orders or judgments in a civil action.
Id.
408. This section does not discuss the "appeal" of an arbitrator's decision to
a trial judge, for example, to modify or vacate the award. See, e.g., Grissom v.
Greener & Sumner Const., Inc., 676 S.W.2d 709, 711 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
409. See, e.g., Grane v. Grane, 130 Ill. App. 3d 332, 473 N.E.2d 1366, 1370
(1985).
410. St. Francis Xavier Hosp. v. Ruscon/Abco, 285 S.C. 584, -, 330 S.E.2d
548, 550 (Ct. App. 1985). (The case involved an attempt to appeal the denial of an
application to consolidate, which the appellate court found not appealable, despite
the fact that the Supreme Court of South Carolina entertained an appeal of an order
granting an application to consolidate.).
411. See, e.g., Burgie v. League Gen. Ins. Co., 355 N.W.2d 466, 468-69 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1984) (interlocutory appeal from an order compelling arbitration denied);
19861
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peal after arbitration without unfairly prejudicing the parties, 4 1 and the
promotion of the favored arbitration process. 413 A court that does not follow
section 19 of the UAA (and is therefore more liberal in allowing appeals)
sometimes justifies an immediate appeal because an order which requires
parties to arbitrate, effectively forces them out of court. Before denying a
judical tribunal, these courts feel the parties should have an immediate right
to hppeal.41 4 Another principle relied on by courts which do not follow the
UAA's appeal provision is that the denial of an immediate right to appeal
denies the party his or her right to a full and complete opportunity to chal-
lenge the existence of a valid arbitration agreement.
41 5
A. Orders Denying a Stay of Arbitration
In J.M. Huber v. Main-Erbauer, Inc., 41 6 the parties entered into a con-
struction contract which contained a clause requiring all claims and disputes
to be determined by arbitration. Huber requested a stay of the arbitration
which the trial court denied. 41 7 The appellate court noted that the Maine
arbitration statute (identical to section 19 of the UAA) allowed an appeal
from an order denying an application to compel arbitration or from an order
granting an application to stay arbitration.4 18 There existed, however, no
provision for an appeal from a denial of a stay of arbitration and therefore
Huber could not immediately appeal the trial court's order. 41 9 In support of
section 19 of the UAA's limitations, the court explained that this approach
encouraged the favored arbitration process, avoided delay caused by unnec-
essary interlocutory appeals, and allowed later appeal without unfair prej-
udice after final judgment.4 20
In Grane v. Grane421 and Clark v. Country Mutual Insurance Co.,422 the
Illinois courts addressed the same issue as was addressed in Main-Erbauer
see also J.M. Huber v. Main-Erbauer, Inc., 493 A.2d 1048, 1050 (Me. 1985).
412. J.M. Huber v. Main-Erbauer, Inc., 493 A.2d 1048, 1050 (Me. 1985).
413. See, e.g., Grane v. Grane, 130 Ill. App. 3d at 332, 338-39, 473 N.E.2d
1366, 1370 (1985); J.M. Huber v. Main-Erbauer, Inc., 493 A.2d 1048, 1050; Burgie
v. League Gen. Ins. Co., 355 N.W.2d 466, 469 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
414. E.g., County of Durham v. Richards & Assoc. Inc., 742 F.2d 811, 813
(4th Cir. 1984) (order compelling arbitration by court effectively put the parties out
of federal court and therefore rendered order immediately appealable).
415. See, e.g., Grane v. Grane, 130 Ill. App. 3d 332, 339, 473 N.E.2d 1366,
1370-71 (1985) (an order denying a stay of arbitration, which is not immediately
appealable under U.A.A. § 19, held appealable).
416. 493 A.2d 1048 (Me. 1985).
417. Id. at 1049.
418. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 5945(I)(A)(B) (1964).
419. J.M. Huber, 493 A.2d at 1050.
420. Id.
421. 130 Ill. App. 3d 332, 473 N.E.2d 1366 (1985).
422. 131 Ill. App. 3d 633, 476 N.E.2d 4 (1985).
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and concluded that an order denying a stay of arbitration by the trial court
was appealable. 23 In Grane the court discussed the difference between the
Illinois arbitration statute appeals provision and the UAA's similar provi-
sion.4 24 The Illinois legislature chose not to adopt section 19(a) of the UAA
and instead adopted only section 19(b) of the UAA.4 21 Illinois, therefore,
lacks any statutory list of appealable orders and simply states that appeals
can be taken as they are allowed in civil cases. 426 In finding this order denying
a stay of arbitration appealable, the Grane court relied on Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 307 and 28 U.S.C. section 1292(a)(1). 427 The court held that this
order was substantially similar to orders granting or denying injunctions and
thus was appealable despite being interlocutory.
42
1
According to the Grane court, the basic principle in support of Illinois'
rather unique statutory modification of section 19 of the UAA is that the
legislature felt the goal of promoting arbitration had to be reconciled with
the countervailing interest that parties should not be forced into arbitration
if no valid agreement to arbitrate exists. The existence of this agreement is
a judicial determination that will be in part emasculated if an order denying
a motion to stay arbitration is unappealable. 429
The court in Clark, like the court in Grane, found that an order which
compels arbitration and denies an application for a stay is an interlocutory
order appealable under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 307(a) because it is
injunctive in nature. 4 0 This court's ruling makes no mention of the Illinois
statute, but rather relies on Illinois case law allowing such appeals.
43
Section 19 of the UAA was adopted in toto by South Carolina and this
is reflected in St. Francis Xavier Hospital v. Ruscon/Abco.432 In St. Francis,
the appellant applied to the circuit court for consolidation of three pending
423. Grane, 130 Ill. App. 3d at 339, 473 N.E.2d at 1370-71; Clark, 131 IlI.
App. 3d at 636, 476 N.E.2d at 5-6.
424. Grane, 130 Ill. App. 3d at 335-36, 473 N.E.2d at 1368.
425. Compare ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 10, § 118 (1981) with UAA § 19 (1955) (the
Illinois statute allows an appeal to be taken in the same manner as in any civil action,
whereas the UAA lists the exact situations which can be appealed, and then as a
procedural matter states in subsection (b) that these appeals are to be handled like
any civil appeal).
426. Grane, 130 Ill. App. 3d at 335-36, 473 N.E.2d at 1368; ILL. REv. STAT.
ch. 10, § 118 (1981).
427. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 307(a)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1976) (authorizing
immediate appeal of order granting or denying preliminary injunctions).
428. Grane, 130 Ill. App. 3d at 337-38, 473 N.E.2d at 1370.
429. Id.
430. Clark v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 131 Ill. App. 3d 633, 636, 476 N.E.2d
at 4, 5-6 (1985).
431. Id. See, e.g., Sefren v. Board of Trustees of Addison Fire Protection
Dist., 60 11l. App. 3d 813, 816-17, 377 N.E.2d 341, 343-44 (1978).
432. 285 S.C. App. 584, 330 S.E.2d 548 (Ct. App. 1985); S.C. CODE ANN. §
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arbitration proceedings, the denial of which gave rise to this appeal .4 133 Relying
on section 15-48-200 of the South Carolina Code, which does not expressly
allow an appeal from an order denying an application to consolidate, 434 the
court held such an order was not immediately appealable.
435
The holding of St. Francis may not be especially unique. What is in-
teresting, however, is the way this court cast aside a South Carolina Supreme
Court precedent which entertained an appeal from an order granting con-
solidation pending arbitration proceedings. 4 6 The St. Francis court acknowl-
edged this precedent, then distinguished it in one brief sentence: "We do not
believe [this] decision controls the appealability of an order denying an ap-
plication to consolidate pending arbitration proceedings. '43 7 This supreme
court decision came one year after the effective date of section 15-48-200.431
The Supreme Court of South Carolina probably considered this statute but
felt it was inapplicable to the action since the original dispute occurred before
the effective date of section 15-48-200.
B. Orders Confirming or Denying an Arbitrator's Award
In Caputo v. Allstate Insurance Co., 43 9 an arbitration panel, in a two
to one decision, entered an award in appellant's favor for $15,000 in damages
caused by a traffic accident. The dissenting arbitrator would have awarded
appellant $60,000 by allowing him to stack" 0 other available uninsured mo-
torist coverages. Appellant filed a petition to set aside, vacate or modify the
arbitration award. That petition was denied by the trial court. 44' Despite
pointing out that judicial review of an arbitration award is severely limited,
the Caputo court allowed the order to be appealed because one of the issues
involved was whether the arbitration award violated the public policy of
Pennsylvania which favors the stacking of uninsured motorist coverages.44 2
This holding is consistent with section 19(a)(3) of the UAA which permits
433. St. Francis, 285 S.C. at -, 330 S.E.2d at 549.
434. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-200 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984).
435. St. Francis, 285 S.C. at -, 330 S.E.2d at 550.
436. Id.; Episcopal Hous. Corp. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 273 S.C. 181, 255 S.E.2d
451 (1979).
437. St. Francis, 285 S.C. at __ , 330 S.E.2d at 550.
438. Episcopal was decided in May of 1979; section 15-48-200 became effective
in May of 1978.
439. 344 Pa. Super. 1, 495 A.2d 959 (1985).
440. "Stacking" would allow the appellant to combine two or more separate
automobile policies containing uninsured motorist coverage, thereby increasing the
total amount of insurance. For example, if three separate policies existed, each con-
taining a statutory minimum of $15,000 of uninsured motorist coverage, "stacking"
would make $45,000 of insurance available, as opposed to only $15,000 if stacking
was not permitted.
441. Caputo, 344 Pa. Super. at -, 495 A.2d at 960.
442. Id. at -, 495 A.2d at 961.
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an appeal of an order confirming or denying the award of an arbitrator." '3
In this case, the trial court's refusal to modify the award acted as a confir-
mation of that award.
Burgie v. League General Insurance Co.4" involved an insurance contract
which contained a provision requiring certain disputes to be resolved by
arbitration. The first judicial involvement was an order by the trial court
affirming the arbitrability of this dispute and compelling arbitration. The
insurer did not immediately appeal this decision. After the arbitrators found
against the insurer and awarded damages to the insured, the insurer sought
an order to vacate this award. The trial court denied this request, thereby
effectively confirming the arbitrator's decision."'
According to section 19(a)(3) of the UAA which Minnesota has adopted,
an immediate right to appeal exists after an order confirming an arbitrator's
award is issued."4 Because the trial court's denial of the motion to vacate
acted as a confirmation of the arbitrator's award, this ruling was immediately
appealable. The appellate court also allowed an appeal on the earlier ruling
on the issue of arbitrability. This appeal was allowed despite the fact the
time for appeal had run between the issuance of the decision by the trial
court and this appeal." 7 This exception was permitted so as to allow for the
arbitration to proceed to a conclusion before hearing an appeal on the ar-
bitrability of the dispute. The policy reason behind this exception was the
Supreme Court's desire to foster the use of arbitration." 8 "Adding an in-
terlocutory appeal to this process "seems to run counter to [this] intent
... "49 This approach saves one adjudicative step and is therefore judicially
efficient because it forces all appealable disputes to wait until after the ar-
bitration process is complete. To rule otherwise would allow for a preliminary
appeal on the issue of arbitrability before the actual arbitration, and then a
second appeal of the trial court's confirmation of the arbitrator's award.
C. Orders Compelling Arbitration
The federal courts, as exemplified by County of Durham v. Richards &
Associates, Inc.,450 are not persuaded by the policies stated in Burgie. In
Durham, a diversity action, the County of Durham appealed from an order
compelling it to arbitrate a dispute with an electrical contractor.4 1' Relying
on 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court held that the order compelling arbitration
443. UAA § 19(a)(3).
444. 355 N.W.2d 466 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
445. Id. at 468.
446. UAA § 19(a)(3); MINN. STAT. § 572.26(3) (Supp. 1985).
447. Burgie, 355 N.W.2d at 468-69.
448. Id. at 469.
449. Id.
450. 742 F.2d 811 (4th Cir. 1984).
451. Id. at 812.
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effectively "put the parties out of federal court" and is therefore an ap-
pealable final order despite being interlocutory. 45 2 The Durham court was
not persuaded by the argument relied on in Burgie, namely, that this ruling
may require an extra step in the adjudication process. It discarded this ar-
gument as no more than speculation and as such it should not bear on the
issue of arbitrability. 453 The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-13 lacks
any provision for appeals similar to section 19 of the UAA. 454
The court in Gardner v. Prudential Insurance Co., 415 expressly relied on
the Pennsylvania statute governing arbitration appeals in holding that no
right to appeal exists from an order compelling arbitration. 456 Under this
statute, a party may appeal an order denying a petition to compel arbitration.
However, no statutory authority exists for review of an order which compels
arbitration. 45 7
In Eckblad v. Farm Bureau Insurance Co.,458 the plaintiff's decedent
was killed in an auto accident and questions arose between two insurance
companies as to the extent of their respective liabilities. Plaintiff brought an
action to compel arbitration which was affirmed.459 According to the Min-
nesota arbitration statute, an order to compel arbitration is not appealable
because it is not a final order.4" An appeal, however, was allowed in this
case because one of the insurance companies addressed more than just the
existence of coverage, it requested the trial court to interpret the policies.
Thereafter, everyone treated the matter as a declaratory judgment.46 Because
a declaratory judgment action determines the rights and liabilities of the
parties under the insurance agreements, it was found to be an appealable
final order.462
D. Orders Denying the Compulsion of Arbitration
In Servomation Corp. v. Hickory Construction Co., 463 an order denying
a motion to compel arbitration was held to be immediately appealable because
452. Id. at 813; 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982) (gives the courts of appeals jurisdiction
to hear all appeals from any final decision). Durham cites eight other circuits which
have concluded this issue in a similar manner. 742 F.2d at 813 (for list of circuits).
453. Durham, 742 F.2d at 814.
454. Compare, UAA § 19 with 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-13 (1982) (no equivalent provision
in 9 U.S.C.).
455. 332 Pa. Super. 358, 481 A.2d 654 (1984).
456. Id. at -, 481 A.2d at 655.
457. Id. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7320 (Purdon 1983) (adopts UAA § 19 with
only slight modifications).
458. 371 N.W.2d 78 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
459. Id. at 79, 80.
460. Id. at 80; MINN. STAT. § 572.26 (Supp. 1985) (adopting UAA § 19).
461. Eckblad, 371 N.W.2d at 80.
462. Id.
463. 70 N.C. App. 309, 318 S.E.2d 904 (1984).
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it involved a "substantial right" that could have been lost if appeal was
delayed until the lawsuit was concluded.46 The Servomation court never
stated what that substantial right was.
States that have adopted the list of appealable orders of section 19 of
the UAA consistently interpret this list as exhaustive and not merely sugges-
tive.46 For those jurisdictions whose statutes lack this specificity, 4 6 the ap-
pealability of a trial judge's order in an arbitration proceeding turns on
factors such as the finality of the order or its similarity to an injunction. 467
The former approach allows for predictability as well as encouraging the use
of arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution process. By denying appeals
of many preliminary decisions until after the arbitration process is complete,
the courts push the parties toward arbitration and away from the overloaded
judicial system. By keeping the right to immediately appeal a trial court's
decision regarding arbitration limited, the courts tend to support, and not
usurp, the authority of the arbitrator. This is vital if arbitration is to continue
to help lighten the judicial load.
VIII. JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
A. Jurisdiction
An agreement to arbitrate confers jurisdiction on the court to enforce
the agreement and to enter judgment. Under the Idaho Arbitration Act "[tihe
term 'court' means any court of competent jurisdiction and an agreement to
submit to arbitration confers jurisdiction on the court to enforce the agree-
ment and to enter judgment on any award thereunder. ." In Bingham County
Commission v. Interstate Electric Company,"9 the Idaho Supreme Court held
464. Id. at 310, 318 S.E.2d at 905.
465. See, e.g., J.M. Huber v. Main-Erbauer, Inc., 493 A.2d 1048, 1050 (Me.
1985) (because no provision in the statute expressly allowed an appeal from a denial
of a stay of arbitration, no appeal was allowed); Gardner v. Prudential Ins. Co., 332
Pa. Super. 358, __, 481 A.2d 654, 655 (1984) (no statutory authority exists for
review of an order which compels arbitration, therefore no appeal was allowed);
Francis Xavier Hosp. v. Ruscon/Abco, 285 S.C. App. 584, -, 330 S.E.2d 548,
550 (1985) (because the statute does not expressly allow an appeal from an order
denying an application to consolidate arbitration proceedings that are pending, no
such appeal was allowed).
466. E.g., County of Durham v. Richards & Assoc., Inc., 742 F.2d 811, 813
(4th Cir. 1984) (order compelling arbitration is appealable as a final order as required
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982)).
467. E.g., Grane v. Grane, 130 Ill. App. 3d 332, 337-38, 473 N.E.2d 1366,
1370 (1985) (whether stay order can be appealed turns on its similarity to an injunc-
tion, which was found to be substantial and therefore appealable).
468. Bingham County Comm'n v. Interstate Elec. Co., 108 Idaho 18,
697 P.2d 1195, 1197 (1985).
469. 108 Idaho 181, 697 P.2d 1195 (1985).
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that an arbitrator's award was not the judgment of a competent tribunal. 470
"The award becomes enforceable when a court enters judgment on the
award." 471
In Clark v. Country Mutual Insurance Co.,472 an Illinois appellate court
stated that: "Where parties enter into an arbitration agreement, the circuit
court is vested with jurisdiction to enforce the agreement and to enter judg-
ment on an award. ' 473 In Clark, the trial court entered an order compelling
arbitration. Country Mutual filed a motion to have that order reconsidered.
The trial court denied the motion and Country Mutual appealed. 474 Country
Mutual contended "that the circuit court has nothing more to do regarding
this litigation concerning the rights and duties of the parties before it." '471
The appellate court found the order to be interlocutory and stated that "[i]f
the parties were to proceed to arbitration under the present order, the circuit
court would still retain jurisdiction to confirm the award, or to vacate,
modify, or correct the award. 476
Florida courts have subject matter jurisdiction over arbitration only when
the agreement to arbitrate "is both subject to the Florida Arbitration Code
and provides for arbitration in Florida. ' 477 In Griffith v. ITT World Com-
munications, Inc.4 7 8 arbitration took place in New York. 479 The plaintiff
sought to modify the award in a Florida state court and the action was
removed to federal court. 480 The district court found that "Florida courts
have limited jurisdiction to modify arbitration awards. ' 48' Since arbitration
took place in New York, 48 2 Florida courts have no jurisdiction, and since the
district court's jurisdiction in this case was derivative 4 83 the district court
also lacked jurisdiction. 48 4
470. Id. at -, 697 P.2d at 1197.
471. Id.
472. Clark v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 131 Ill. App. 3d 633, 476 N.E.2d 4
(1985).
473. Id. at 635, 476 N.E.2d at 5 (citing ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 10, para. 116
(1983)).
474. Clark, 131 Ill. App. 3d at 635, 476 N.E.2d at 5.
475. Id. at 636, 476 N.E.2d at 5.
476. Id. (Nonetheless, the court held the order could be appealed "as it is
injunctive in nature." Id. at 636, 476 N.E.2d at 6. See also Grane v. Grane, 130 Ill.
App. 332, 473 N.E.2d 1366 (1985)).
477. Griffith v. ITT World Communications, Inc., 611 F. Supp. 1567, 1568
(S.D. Fla. 1985).
478. 611 F. Supp. 1567 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
479. Id. at 1568.
480. Id. at 1567.
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"Whether a party consented to arbitrate a dispute in the first instance
is a jurisdictional question that must be decided by the court. ' 45 In Gaslin,
Inc. v. L.G.C. Exports, Inc. , 6 one party signed the arbitration agreement
for a company involved in the dispute.487 This party claimed the agreement
did not give the arbitrator jurisdiction over him." 8 The court stated that
"although the arbitrator is the final judge of law and fact, his power has
not been extended to the degree that he may determine his own jurisdiction,
that is, whether the arbitratiQn tribunal has the requisite power to hear the
particular case brought before it. "49 The court stated that the determination
of whether there was an agreement to arbitrate and which disputes fall under
the agreement are matters for the court to decide.
490
A party seeking arbitration must apply to the court by motion in order
to stay litigation and compel arbitration.4 91 In Adams v. Nelson,492 the defend-
ants alleged failure to state facts upon which relief could be granted.
493
Defendants claimed in the alternative that because the arbitration clause was
appended to and incorporated by reference into plaintiff's complaint, the
court was ousted of its jurisdiction, and that the trial court was required to
grant the Rule 12(b)(6) motion on jurisdictional grounds. 94 The Supreme
Court of North Carolina held that the trial court was not ousted of its
jurisdiction because the defendants failed to apply to the court by proper
motion for arbitration.4 95
Under Illinois' version of the UAA,496 appellate courts have jurisdiction
to entertain appeals from orders denying motions to stay arbitration. 497 Un-
like the UAA, section 18 of the Illinois Act allows appeals "in the same
manner, upon the same terms, and with like effect as in civil cases.1 498 In
Grane v. Grane,499 the court analogized such an order with the denial to
grant an injunction and found jurisdiction to hear such an appeal. 5°°
485. Gaslin, Inc. v. L.G.C. Exports, Inc., 334 Pa. Super. 132, -, 482 A.2d
1117, 1121 (1984).
486. 334 Pa. Super. 132, 482 A.2d 1117 (1984).
487. Id. at__, 482 A.2d at 1119.
488. Id.
489. Id. at -, 482 A.2d at 1121.
490. Id.
491. Adams v. Nelson, 313 N.C. 442, -, 329 S.E.2d 322, 325 (1985).
492. 313 N.C. 442, 329 S.E.2d 322 (1985).
493. Id. at __, 329 S.E.2d at 323.
494. Id. at , 329 S.E.2d at 323-24.
495. Id. at __, 329 S.E.2d at 324.
496. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 10 §§ 101-123 (1969).
497. Grane v. Grane, 130 Ill App. 332, 334-39, 473 N.E.2d 1366, 1368-71
(1985).
498. Id. at 335, 473 N.E.2d at 1368 (quoting ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 10, para. 118
(1981)).
499. 130 Ill. App. 332, 473 N.E.2d 1366 (1985).
500. Id. at 334-39, 473 N.E.2d at 1368-71.
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Such appeals are not allowed under the UAA.5 0 The Grane court sug-
gested that the UAA is designed to aid parties promptly resolve disputes. 0 2
However, the court declined to follow that approach stating that "[tihe
structure of the Illinois arbitration statute . . . suggests that the legislature
intended courts to determine at the outset whether the parties had in fact
entered into an agreement to arbitrate." 5 3 The court observed that their
approach would facilitate the speedy resolution of the dispute by avoiding
arbitration where there is no agreement to arbitrate.5 4
In Paine, Webber, Jackson, and Curtis, Inc. v. Bennett, °5 the appellate
court declined to hear an appeal from an order denying a motion to compel
arbitration.) ° In Paine, the complaint that the appeal was based on had been
dismissed with leave to amend.50 7 The appeal was dismissed for lack of ju-
risdiction since it was not a final order and the appellate court would not
issue advisory opinions.50
An appellate court has jurisdiction to review an otherwise non-appealable
interlocutory order when that order departs from the requirements of law. °9
In Ripple v. Packard,5 l0 the trial court granted a motion to vacate an arbi-
trator's award under the Florida Arbitration Act without ordering a rehearing
before the arbitrator."' The appellee challenged the appellate court's juris-
diction on appeal. In holding that the order was appealable, the court stated
that "[an order vacating an arbitration award without directing a rehearing
is a departure from the essential requirements of law.' '512
The court does not necessarily lose jurisdiction to review an arbitrator's
award when proper service is not made within the statuatory period.5 3 In
Big Beaver Falls Area School District v. Big Beaver Falls Area Educational
Association,5 1 4 the school district made service by regular mail rather than
by deputized service as required by statute . 5 Before the thirty day statute516
had run, the school board filed a petition for review as allowed under the
501. UAA § 19.
502. Grane, 130 II1. App. 332 at -, 473 N.E.2d at 1370.
503. Id. at 338, 473 N.E.2d at 1370.
504. Id. at 338-39, 473 N.E.2d at 1370.




509. Ripple v. Packard, 471 So. 2d 1293, 1294 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
510. 471 So. 2d 1293.
511. Id. at 1294.
512. Id. at 1294 (order vacating an award without directing a rehearing is
appealable under FLA. STAT. § 682.20(e)(1983)).
513. Big Beaver Falls Area School Dist. v. Big Beaver Falls Area Educ. Ass'n.,
89 Pa. Commw. 176, 492 A.2d 87 (1985).
514. 89 Pa. Commw. 176, 492 A.2d 87 (1985).
515. Id. at -, 492 A.2d at 88.
516. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7314(b) (1982).
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Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure.1 17 The trial court dismissed the pe-
tition for lack of jurisdiction since proper service was not made." 8 The
appellate court reversed holding that a reissuance of the petition was proper
where there was no sign the party seeking review "sought to stall the legal
machinery it set in motion by filing its petition for review. ''519
B. Judgment or Decree on Award
Section 14 of the UAA provides that once a judgment or decree is entered
in conformity with the granting of an order confirming, modifying, or cor-
recting an arbitration award, that judgment or decree is to be enforced like
any other judgment or decree. 2 Recent court decisions have underscored
one aspect of judgments or decrees in the context of arbitration awards; the
finality of those rulings.
In Rodgers Builders, Inc. v. McQueen,521 a North Carolina appellate
court held that the doctrine of res judicata applies to a judgment entered on
an arbitration award just as it does to any other judgment. A construction
company had sought damages from an owner for fraud, unfair and deceptive
trade practices, and negligent misrepresentation after previously submitting
the dispute to arbitration. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for
a summary judgment explaining there was no genuine issue in controversy.5 2 2
The appellate court affirmed, holding that a judgment entered on an arbi-
tration award is conclusive on the issue in controversy, and bars subsequent
litigation arising out of the same dispute or cause of action. The court
concluded that, in light of North Carolina's policy favoring arbitration, the
language of the arbitration clause in question was broad enough to include
any claims, whether characterized as tort or contract, arising out of the
parties' contractual relationship.
523
Similiarly, in Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Gridley, 24 the court
held that res judicata is applicable to an arbitrator's final award1 2 According
to the court, actual claims 526 raised by Gridley and decided by the arbitration
517. Big Beaver, 89 Pa. Commw. at -, 492 A.2d at 89.
518. Id. at ,492 A.2d at 88.
519. Id. at _, 492 A.2d at 90.
520. UAA § 14 ("Upon the granting of an order confirming, modifying or
correcting an award, judgment or decree shall be entered in conformity therewith
and be enforced as any other judgement or decree.").
521. 76 N.C. App. 16, 331 S.E.2d 726 (1985), reh'g denied, 315 N.C. 590, 341
S.E.2d 29 (1986).
522. Id. at__, 331 S.E.2d at 730.
523. Id. at , 331 S.E.2d at 732.
524. 362 N.W.2d 100 (S.D. 1985).
525. Id. at 103.
526. Res judicata applies to claims actually raised and to those claims that
could have been raised. The court's holding was limited to claims Gridley actually
raised in the arbitration proceedings. The court did not have occasion to address
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panel were properly disposed of by the trial court in rendering a summary
judgment against Gridley. 52 7
In Save Charleston Foundation v. Murray,5 28 a South Carolina appellate
court held that prosecution of a claim on a different theory is barred when
that same claim was properly adjudicated in arbitration. A vendor of property
brought action on a promissory note following arbitration of a previous
action based upon the note. The purchaser asserted an affirmative defense
of prior arbitration and the trial court dismissed the claim.5 29 The appellate
court affirmed, relying on the common law doctrine of election of remedies.
It explained that invocation of one remedy which reaches the stage of final
adjudication will bar another remedy for the same wrong. The appellate
court noted that South Carolina statutes established arbitration as one mode
of procedure and relief. It further noted that to conclude otherwise would
defeat the purpose of arbitration, that is, to avoid litigation.5 a0
The courts consistently adhere to the text of the UAA and narrowly
interpret its provisions. This promotes uniformity of interpretation since ref-
erence to the Act does not depend upon conflicting judicial inferences and
exceptions. To effecuate this policy courts rely upon rules of civel procedure
and deny declaratory relief as a collateral means of challenging an arbitrator's
decision.
In Libery Mutual Insurance Co. v. Matuga5 31 the court stated that the
trial judge incorrectly granted summary judgment because Libery Mutual's
request for arbitration was pending at the time of summary judgment. 3 2 The
court disposed of the case on procedural grounds that are somewhat related
to the express policy of section 2(d) of the UAA.533 The grant of summary
judgement would have been a judicial gloss on the language of section 2(d).
By denying the grant of summary judgment, the court adhered to a uniform
interpretation of the act.
In Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange v. Sanford, 3 4 the court
limited the complaining party to the express relief provided for in the UAA.535
It then refused to treat the complainant's petition for declaratory relief as a
motion to vacate. 3 6 Detroit Automobile challenged the unfavorable arbitra-
whether res judicata applies to the counterclaims which Gridley could have raised.
Id.
527. Gridley, 362 N.W.2d at 103.
528. 286 S.C. 170, 333 S.E.2d 60 (Ct. App. 1985).
529. Id. at -, 333 S.E.2d at 63.
530. Id. at 333 S.E.2d at 64.
531. 471 N.E.2d 737 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984).
532. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-2-1 (Bums Supp. 1985).
533. UAA § 2(d) (for text of §2(d), see supra note 213).
534. 141 Mich. App. 820, 369 N.W.2d 239 (1985).
535. Id. at 825, 369 N.W.2d at 242. The only two methods in the UAA to
challenge an arbitrator's decision are motions to vacate and motions to modify or
correct. UAA §§ 12, 13.
536. Detroit Automobile, 141 Mich. App. at 827, 369 N.W.2d at 243.
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tor's decision as contrary to the contract in question. The court held that
declaratory relief was unavailable to Detroit Automobile because an arbitra-
tor's decision can be challenged only as provided in the act." 7 The court also
held that if a petition for declaratory relief is filed after the time requirement
for a motion to vacate and without a showing of "excusable neglect," the
petition will not be considered a motion to vacate.53 This narrow construction
indicates that parties must strictly adhere to the express provisions of the
UAA.
IX. ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS
Section 5 of the UAA prescribes the procedure to be followed in an
arbitration hearing if the arbitration agreement itself does not provide oth-
erwise.3 9 It also provides that arbitrators may hear and determine the con-
troversy even if a duly notified party fails to appear for the hearing.
In Von Engineering v. R. W. Roberts Construction Co., 1 ° a Florida
appellate court held that an arbitration award against a contractor was en-
forceable against the contractor's surety when the surety waived its right to
participate in an arbitration hearing. A corporation had filed a claim against
the contractor and its surety. The defendants, represented by the same coun-
sel, moved to compel arbitration. The trial court granted the motion. The
corporation filed its own demand for arbitration naming the contractor as
the party upon which the demand was being made. The contractor counter-
claimed but the surety did not participate. When the corporation later sought
confirmation of the arbitration award, the surety moved for dismissal claim-
ing it was not a party to the arbitration proceedings and the award was
effective only against the contractor. The corporation then filed an amended
complaint alleging that the surety had notice of the arbitration proceedings
and elected not to participate.5 4' The trial court dismissed the complaint, but
537. Id. at 825, 369 N.W.2d at 242.
538. Id. at 827, 369 N.W.2d at 243.
539. UAA § 5 states:
Unless otherwise provided by the agreement:
(a) The arbitrators shall appoint a time and place for the hearing and
cause notification to the parties to be served personally or by registered mail
not less than five days before the hearing. Appearance at the hearing waives
such notice. The arbitrators may adjourn the hearing from time to time as
necessary and, on request of a party and for good cause, or upon their own
motion may postpone the hearing to a time not later than the date fixed by
the agreement for making the award unless the parties consent to a later
date. The arbitrators may hear and determine the controversy upon the
evidence produced notwithstanding the failure of a party duly notified to
appear. The court on application may direct the arbitrators to proceed
promptly with the hearing and determination of the controversy.
Id.
540. 457 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
541. Id. at 1082.
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the appellate court reversed saying the arbitration award would be conclusive
against the surety if it waived its right to appear at the arbitration hearing.
The appellate court acknowledged that persons whose rights are affected by
arbitration proceedings have a right to be heard after reasonable notice, but
noted that common law recognizes a judgment against a principal may be
conclusive against a surety even if the surety does not participate. 42
A "waiver" of the entire arbitration hearing process was upheld by a
Florida appellate court in Hall v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. 43 An
insured had challenged the arbitration procedure outlined in her insurance
policy because it did not include a provision for an evidentiary hearing. The
appellate court rejected the challenge, noting that the Florida statute outlining
the hearing procedure also provides, in language similar to that of section 5
of the UAA, that a hearing can be waived if it "[I]s otherwise provided by
the agreement or provision for arbitration . . ... ,4 In other words, the
appellate court concluded that the statutory language deferred to the arbi-
tration agreement not only for the procedure of an arbitration hearing but
also on the question of whether a hearing will be held at all.
Generally, courts will not inquire into the characteristics of arbitrators.
In Atrium Westwood VIII Venture v. Barrick Westwood Ltd. Partnership,5 45
the court held that a neutral arbitrator, selected and agreed upon by the
parties, rendered a valid arbitration award even though the other two agreed-
upon arbitrators did not participate in the hearing.'" The arbitration agree-
ment provided that three persons were to be selected to resolve the contro-
versy; one by each party and a neutral third arbitrator decided upon by both
parties. Atrium's arbitrator was unable to attend the hearing on the scheduled
date. Consequently, Barrick's arbitrator withdrew from the arbitration panel.
The neutral arbitrator conducted the hearing and entered an award favorable
to Barrick. Despite Atrium's argument that the Texas Arbitration Act re-
quired all three arbitrators to conduct the hearing,5 47 the court held that the
hearing was properly conducted for several reasons. First, the appearing
arbitrator was neutral. Second, Atrium neglected to appoint a substitute
arbitrator. Finally, the court stated that "[Tihe purpose of arbitration is to
encourage speedy resolution of controversies.' '548
542. Id.
543. 454 So. 2d 711 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
544. Id. at 713; see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 682.06 (1967).
545. 693 S.W.2d 699 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).
546. Id. at 700-01.
547. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 228 § C (Vernon 1973) states:
The hearing shall be conducted by all the arbitrators but a majority may
determine any question and render a final award. If, during the course of
the hearing, an arbitrator for any reason ceases to act, the remaining ar-
bitrator or arbitrators appointed to act as neutrals may continue with the
hearing and determination of the controversy.
Id.
548. Atrium Westwood, 693 S.W.2d at 701.
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In Orr v.Orr,54 9 the court held that arbitrators who were members of a
designated church conducted a valid arbitration proceeding.5 0 According to
the arbitration agreement, the arbitration panel was to consist of members
belonging to the same church as the parties. The defendant had argued the
panel was, "in reality, an ecclesiastical court."55 ' The court ruled that the
mere fact "that the arbitrators were members of the designated church did
not, without more," invalidate the arbitration proceedings.1
2
X. JUDIcIAL REVIEW
Judicial review of an arbitrator's award is strictly limited. As the parties
have chosen arbitration over a judicial proceeding, great deference is given
to the arbitrator's decision.
A party seeking judicial review of an arbitrator's award must strictly
comply with the procedures set out in the arbitration statute. For example,
application for review must be made within the specified time limit.553 A
party who has not complied strictly with the procedure for review set out in
the arbitration act will not be allowed to collaterally attack an arbitrator's
decision in court.554 The scope of judicial review is governed by the juris-
diction's arbitration act. 5 5 Absent a reason for judicial review recognized by
the arbitration act, a court will not disturb an arbitrator's decision.
A court will stay arbitration upon evidence that grounds exist for the
revocation of the contractual agreement to arbitrate. 5 6 Clear and convincing
evidence is required, however, before a court will vacate an arbitrator's
award.5 57 A court may be more willing to vacate an arbitrator's decision
resolving a dispute between an attorney and a client. The court has broader
power to inquire into an attorney-client arbitration, based upon its "inherent
power to regulate the practice of members of the bar and provide for proper
administration of justice. 558
A party seeking judicial review must apply to a court within the time
limit specified by the arbitration statute. In Orr v. Orr,5 9 two sons filed suit
549. 108 Idaho 874, 702 P.2d 912 (1985).
550. Id. at __, 702 P.2d at 914.
551. Id. at , 702 P.2d at 913.
552. Id. at 702 P.2d at 914.
553. Orr v. Orr, 108 Idaho 874, -, 702 P.2d 912, 914 (1985).
554. Prudential Property and Casualty Ins. Co. v. McDaniel, 342 Pa. Super.
557, -, 493 A.2d 731, 732 (1985).
555. City of Boulder City v. Gen. Sales Drivers, 101 Nev. 117, 118-19, 694
P.2d 498, 500 (1985).
556. Gulf Interstate Eng'g v. Pecos Pipeline, 680 S.W.2d 879, 881 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1984).
557. Burd, Inc. v. Stoneville Furniture Co., 134 Ill. App. 3d 149, -, 479
N.E.2d 962, 965 (1985).
558. Marino v. Tagaris, 395 Mass. 397, -, 480 N.E.2d 286, 289 (1985).
559. 108 Idaho 874, 702 P.2d 912 (1985).
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against their father for an alleged breach of a lease for farmland and equip-
ment. The parties agreed to discontinue the litigation and submit their dispute
to arbitration. Following the arbitrators' decision in the sons' favor, the sons
filed a motion in the district court where the litigation had been pending
requesting confirmation of the arbitrators' decision.16 The father filed an
application to vacate the decision, alleging that the arbitration proceedings
had been procedurally defective because the witnesses had not been under
oath and attorneys were not allowed to appear for the parties. The father's
application to vacate was filed five months after he received a copy of the
arbitrators' decision, although the arbitration act required that such appli-
cation be made within ninety days. 6 1 The court held that the father's failure
to comply with the time limit was an absolute bar to the court considering
the merits of his motion to vacate. 62
A court will not allow a party to ignore the procedure for judicial review
set out in the arbitration act and attack an arbitrator's decision collaterally
in court. In Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance v. McDaniel,5 63 an
insurance company brought a declaratory judgment action to determine the
validity of an arbitration award entered against it. The court stated that the
proper procedure would have been for the insurance company to have filed
an application to vacate.64 The court held that Prudential could not obtain
review of the arbitration award by a declaratory judgment proceeding. 65
A court's scope of judicial review is governed by the jurisdiction's ar-
bitration act. The UAA as adopted by Pennsylvania provides that where a
controversy is submitted to arbitration by the Commonwealth government,
or where it is submitted by a political subdivision and the controversy is with
an employee or his representative, or where a person is required by law to
submit a controversy to arbitration, a reviewing court shall modify the award
where it is contrary to law.5 66 In Upper Merion Area School District v. Upper
Merion Education Association,5 67 a school district and a teachers' association
had engaged in collective bargaining following a teachers strike. The final
agreement provided that the work year would be reduced to 174 days as a
result of the strike. Subsequently, a Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
ruled in the case of Scanlon v. Mount Union Area Board of School Direc-
tors,5 6 that 180 instructional days per year were mandatory, and that a strike
560. Id. at __, 702 P.2d at 913.
561. Id. at , 702 P.2d at 914.
562. Id.
563. 342 Pa. Super. 557, 493 A.2d 731 (1985).
564. Id. at -, 493 A.2d at 732.
565. Id.
566. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7302(d) (Purdon 1982).
567. 85 Pa. Commw. 115, 482 A.2d 274 (1984).
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justified less than 180 days only if it rendered scheduling of additional days
impossible.5 69 Following the Mount Union decision, the Upper Merion Ed-
ucation Association asked the school district to reschedule the missed in-
structional days. When the school district refused, the issue was submitted
to arbitration. The arbitrator noted that the school district had not provided
180 instructional days though it would have been possible to reschedule the
missed days. The arbitrator ruled, therefore, that the 174-work day provision
in the collective bargaining agreement was invalid and the teachers were
entitled to pay for the additional work days which would have been required
to meet the 180 day provision.5 70 A Court of Common Pleas affirmed the
arbitrator's award, and the school district appealed to the same Common-
wealth Court which had decided Mount Union. The Court refused to affirm
the arbitrator's award because it concluded that the Mount Union decision
was addressed to instructional days, not work days. Therefore, the court
held that the 174-work day provision in the collective bargaining agreement
was not invalidated by the Mount Union decision as a matter of law. 1
In General Accident Insurance Co. v. St. Peter, 57 2 an arbitrator had
arrived at his awards to three injured passengers by stacking the driver's
uninsured motorist benefits. The driver's uninsured motorist policy provided
coverage of $30,000 for each of the driver's three vehicles. Though only one
of the vehicles was involved in the accident, the arbitrator awarded a total
of $90,000 to the three passengers by stacking, or totalling the coverage for
all three vehicles. A lower court refused to vacate or modify the awards.5 73
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania remanded the case with instructions to
modify the awards, as claimants who do not pay premiums and are not
named as beneficiaries of the driver's insurance policy are not allowed the
privilege of stacking, according to Pennsylvania law.574
In Abramovich v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania Liquor
Control Board,5 75 the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board awarded a ware-
houseman a contract to transport liquor. The warehouseman had used non-
union labor rates in figuring his bid. When the union began picketing his
warehouse, the warehouseman entered into a collective bargaining agreement
with the union, requiring him to pay union wages. The contract, which
included a provision for arbitration, authorized an adjustment of the bid
should there be a mandatory requirement that the warehouseman change the
rate of payment for labor .1 76 The arbitrator denied the warehouseman's re-
569. Scanlon, 51 Pa. Commw. at -, 415 A.2d at 100.
570. Mount Union, 85 Pa. Commw. at __, 482 A.2d at 276.
571. Id. at -, 482 A.2d at 277.
572. 334 Pa. Super. 6, 482 A.2d 1051 (1984).
573. Id. at __, 482 A.2d at 1052.
574. Id. at __, 482 A.2d at 1054.
575. 86 Pa. Commw. 524, 485 A.2d 872 (1984).
576. Id. at __, 485 A.2d at 873.
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quest for an adjustment.177 The court affirmed the arbitrator's denial of the
adjustment, holding that there was no mandatory requirement that the ware-
houseman enter into the collective bargaining agreement and thereby change
his rate of payment for labor."7 In affirming the arbitrator's decision, the
court noted that its scope of review was governed by Pennsylvania statute
section 7302 (d)(2), which allows modification or correction of an award only
if that award is contrary to law.5 79
The Nevada Supreme Court held that when a statute requires arbitration
and the legislature intends that the decision of the arbitrator be final and
binding, judicial review is governed by Nevada's Arbitration Act. In City of
Boulder City v. General Sales Drivers,580 a dispute between firemen and the
city was submitted to arbitration pursuant to state statute. 8 The city peti-
tioned for review of the arbitrator's decision, contending that the decision
must be reviewed according to the broader standards established for govern-
mental agencies by the Nevada Administrative Procedures Act. The court
denied the city's petition for review, holding that when the legislature passed
the statute requiring arbitration, it did so with the intention that the pro-
cedures of the UAA including its limited standards of judicial review, should
apply.2 2
A court will stay arbitration upon evidence that grounds exist at law or
in equity for revocation of the contractual agreement to arbitrate. In Gulf
Interstate Engineering v. Pecos Pipeline,583 evidence showed that a previous
contract between Gulf and Pecos contained no arbitration clause, and that
Gulf had falsely represented to Pecos that Pecos' attorney had approved a
new contract containing the arbitration agreement. The Texas Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the trial court's determination and stayed arbitration pro-
ceedings on the grounds that there was evidence Gulf had fraudulently induced
Pecos into agreeing to arbitration. 584
An arbitrator's award is presumed valid and will not be vacated absent
clear and convincing evidence. In Burd, Inc. v. Stoneville Furniture Com-
pany,585 a dispute over the value of certain accounts receivable was submitted
to an arbitrator pursuant to a contract between Burd and Stoneville. Sub-
sequently, Stoneville filed suit against Burd in a United States District Court,
alleging breach of warranty of good title regarding real property Burd had
transferred to Stoneville. Both parties agreed to stay the District Court action
577. Id.
578. Id. at -, 485 A.2d at 874.
579. Id.
580. 101 Nev. 117, 694 P.2d 498 (1985).
581. Id. at 118, 694 P.2d at 499.
582. Id. at 118-19, 694 P.2d at 500.
583. 680 S.W.2d 879 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
584. Id. at 883.
585. 134 Ill. App. 3d 149, 479 N.E.2d 962 (1985).
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pending the arbitrator's decision. Burd twice requested that the arbitrator
dismiss the arbitration on the basis that Stoneville's filing of the lawsuit was
a waiver of the agreement to arbitrate which revoked the arbitrator's juris-
diction. The arbitrator failed to address jurisdiction and ruled in favor of
Stoneville. 8 6 In considering Burd's motion to vacate the arbitrator's award
on the grounds that the arbitrator had exceeded his power by failing to
address jurisdiction, the court stated that Stoneville did not waive its right
to arbitration by filing the lawsuit . 8 7 Given that determination, the court
held that Burd did not meet its burden of proving by clear, strong and
convincing evidence that the arbitrator had exceeded his powers.5 8
In Prince George's County Educators' Association, Inc. v. Board of
Education of Prince George's County, 8 9 the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland held that an arbitrator's award is not subject to judicial revision
unless it is "completely irrational."5 90 A dispute arose between the educators'
association and the school board when the school board refused to pay driver
education teachers the amount set forth in its collective bargaining agreement.
The two parties submitted the dispute to arbitration pursuant to the collective
bargaining agreement.5 91 The arbitrator ruled that because the Maryland Gen-
eral Assembly had abolished its requirement that each county board of ed-
ucation offer driver education, the driver education school was no longer a
party to the collective bargaining agreement and, therefore, could not demand
the pay specified in the agreement. 92 The court ruled that the driver education
school was not a separate entity from the board of education, and was,
therefore, still a party to the collective bargaining agreement. As the arbi-
trator's award was based on the erroneous factual conclusion that the driver
education school was no longer a party to the collective bargaining agreement,
the court vacated the arbitrator's award, holding that it was completely
irrational1 9
In Marino v. Tagaris, 594 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
indicated that a court will inquire more closely into arbitration involving an
attorney-client dispute. An attorney had represented a client in a divorce
proceeding in Marino. When a dispute over the attorney's fees arose, the
client agreed to submit the controversy to the Legal Fee Arbitration Board
of the Massachusetts Bar Association. The client received literature from the
board which indicated that the arbitration hearing would be informal and
586. Id. at , 479 N.E.2d at 963.
587. Id. at __, 479 N.E.2d at 965.
588. Id.
589. 61 Md. App. 249, 486 A.2d 228 (1985), cert. granted, 492 A.2d 616 (1985).
590. Id. at 253, 486 A.2d at 231.
591. Id. at 251, 486 A.2d at 230.
592. Id.
593. Id. at 256, 486 A.2d at 233.
594. 395 Mass. 397, 480 N.E.2d 286 (1985).
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that she would not need an attorney. At the arbitration hearing, the client
spoke for two minutes, while the attorney made a lengthy presentation, which
the client was given no time to rebut. The arbitrators ruled against the client.
When the attorney brought an action to confirm the arbitrators' award, the
client contended that she had not had adequate opportunity to present her
case and that she was not informed that the arbitrators' award could have
been vacated or modified in court. 95 In vacating the award, the court stated
that it had broader power to inquire into an attorney-client arbitration based
upon the court's "inherent power to regulate practices of members of the
bar and to provide for the proper administration of justice." ' 596
Cases interpreting the UAA seem to be consistent in their deference to
the arbitrator's decision. The strict procedural requirements which must be
met in order to challenge an arbitrator's award, along with the heightened
standards of review indicate that courts would prefer that the arbitrator's
decision be final and binding on the parties.
XI. TIMELINESS
The substantive rights of a party under an arbitration agreement may
be lost if they are not asserted in a timely fashion. Certain claims and defenses
must be asserted within the proper time period, whether that period is set
by statute or in the arbitration agreement. 597 Generally, timeliness issues arise
in two different manners under the UAA. First, questions frequently concern
the timeliness of a demand for arbitration. 98 Since the resolution of this
question usually requires interpretation of the arbitration agreement, courts
leave questions on this issue to the arbitrator. The UAA itself provides no
guidelines for assessing the timeliness of demands for arbitration. Second,
questions often arise as to the timeliness of motions to vacate, modify, or
correct an arbitration award.5 9 When faced with this issue, courts strictly
apply the time limits provided by state versions of the UAA in order to
determine the timeliness of the motion. 6m
595. Id. at ,480 N.E.2d at 288.
596. Id. at __, 480 N.E.2d at 289.
597. Recent Developments 1983, supra note 3, at 205.
598. E.g., County of Durham v. Richards & Assoc., 742 F.2d 811 (4th Cir.
1984); Roseville Community School Dist. v. Roseville Fed'n of Teachers, 137 Mich.
App. 118, 357 N.W.2d 829 (1984).
599. E.g., Tung v. W.T. Cabe & Co., 492 A.2d 267 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Jaffe
v. Nocera, 493 A.2d 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
600. The UAA provides that applications to vacate, modify, or correct an
arbitrator's award must be made within ninety days after the award is made. UAA
§§ 12(b), 13(a). However, if a motion to vacate is based on allegations of "corruption,
fraud or other undue means," the ninety day period does not begin to run until
"such grounds are known or should have been known." UAA § 12(b). No other
exceptions to this limitations period is specified in the UAA.
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A. Demand for Arbitration
Courts routinely decline to consider whether a party has made a timely
demand for arbitration. In County of Durham v. Richards and Associates,60 1
the court held that a party cannot raise timeliness as a defense in an action
to compel arbitration because that determination is reserved to the arbitra-
tor .602 The contract in question contained a clause requiring a party to file
a demand before the running of the applicable statute of limitations. Al-
though it appeared from the facts that the demand was untimely, the court
nevertheless compelled arbitration. 603
In Roseville Community School District v. Roseville Federation of
Teachers,6 the issue of timeliness centered around whether the grievance
complained of was continuing or temporary in nature. The arbitrator had
found the grievance to be continuing and held the demand for arbitration
was timely. The plaintiff moved to vacate the award, asserting that this
finding was error. The court refused to review the finding, however, holding
that such a determination was a procedural matter that could only be de-
termined by the arbitrator. 6w 5
B. Motions to Vacate, Modify or Correct
Courts have generally adhered to a strict application of the time limits
governing motions to vacate, modify or correct arbitration awards.60 The
rational behind strict application includes promotion of finality and certainty
of arbitration awards, retention of arbitration as an expedient process, and
assurance that any mistake in the arbitration proceeding will be promptly
corrected. Only in situations where these purposes would not be served have
the courts indicated that they might toll the statutory time limits.
In Tung v. W. T. Cabe & Co.,607 the parties submitted to arbitration a
dispute arising out of appellee's management of appellant's securities in ac-
cordance with the National Association of Security Dealers (NASD) Code
of Arbitration Procedure. After issuance of the award by the arbitrator,
appellant requested reconsideration of the award. The arbitrator denied re-
consideration and the appellant moved to vacate the award. The trial court
held the motion untimely because it had not been filed within the ninety days
601. 742 F.2d 811 (4th Cir. 1984).
602. Id. at 815.
603. Id.
604. 137 Mich. App. 118, 357 N.W.2d 829 (1984).
605. Id. at 124-25, 357 N.W.2d at 833.
606. The UAA § 12(b) ("An application under this section shall be made within
ninety days after a delivery of a copy of this award to the appellant.").
607. 492 A.2d 267 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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of the receipt of the award by the appellant.6 8 Appellant contended, however,
that his request for reconsideration had tolled the statutory time limit and,
since he had moved to vacate within ninety days of the denial of the recon-
sideration, the motion was timely. The court dismissed this contention be-
cause the guidelines did not contain a procedure for reconsideration of an
award, and thus distinguished the case from those in which the arbitration
guidelines provide for reconsideration, rehearing, or other forms of review
by the arbitrator. 6m
In Jaffe v. Nocera,610 the court held untimely an application by the
defendant to vacate an arbitration award on the ground that he was not
personally liable under a contract because it was filed more than ten months
after issuance of the award. 61  The defendant argued that the statutory time
limit had been tolled when he filed a timely motion for reconsideration of
the award by the arbitrators. The court declined to decide whether such action
would toll the statutory time limit, because the defendant had not raised lack
of personal liability when he sought reconsideration. 6 2 Tolling the statute,
the court said, might be proper when the arbitrators need time to correct
their own errors and reach a final judgment, to prevent simultaneous con-
sideration of the same issue by the court and the arbitrator, and to refrain
from compelling a party to seek judicial review during reconsideration of the
award by the arbitrator. 613 Since none of these situations were present here,
it was concluded tolling the statute would serve no useful purpose.
In Quirk v. Data Terminal Systems,614 the court held untimely a motion
to correct and affirm an arbitration award which contained a clerical error
because the motion was filed after the statutory time limit had expired. The
plaintiff argued that under the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure a
judge could correct clerical errors in arbitration awards without regard to
the statutory time limit. 6 6 The court found the procedural rule and the
statutory time limit in conflict and, since the latter was more specific, the
latter governed. 617
In Orr v. Orr,6 8 the appellant contended that the arbitration proceedings
contained procedural defects which were valid grounds for vacating an award.
However, the court held that failure to comply with the statutory time limit
for vacating an arbitration award creates an absolute bar, even when the
608. Id. at 269.
609. Id. at 269-70.
610. 493 A.2d 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
611. Id.
612. Id. at 1012.
613. Id.
614. 394 Mass. 334, 475 N.E.2d 1208 (1985).
615. Id. at __, 475 N.E.2d at 1211.
616. Id. at , 475 N.E.2d at 1211-12.
617. Id. at __, 475 N.E.2d at 1212.
618. 108 Idaho 874, 702 P.2d 912 (1985).
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party seeking to vacate the award has a valid reason for doing so under the
statute. 619
In L U.B.A.C. Local Union # 31 v. Anastasi Brothers, Corp. ,620 the court
stated that the failure to move to vacate an arbitration award within the
applicable time limits would generally bar a party from later seeking the same
relief in a counterclaim to an action to confirm an arbitration award. 621 The
court, however, permitted the defendant's counterclaim, because the defend-
ant alleged that the contract was illegal. 62 2 It reasoned that the validity of
the contract must be determined before either the contract or the arbitration
award will be enforced. 623
In Poire v. Kaplan,624 the court held that even though the parties' agree-
ment to arbitrate was not in writing at the time arbitration was ordered by
the court, once the parties submitted to arbitration in compliance with the
statute, they also submitted to rules governing modification of the award.6 25
As a result, failure to comply with the statutory time limit for moving to
vacate an award barred the movant from seeking judicial review. 626
XII. PREEMPTION
State arbitration law has been preempted, in part, by the United States
Supreme Court because of the national policy favoring the enforceability of
arbitration agreements expressed by the congressional enactment of the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act (FAA).627 From the perspective of state courts, preemp-
tion creates a body of federal substantive law which must be applied when
the issue of enforceability of arbitration agreements falls within the scope of
the FAA. 62 An arbitration agreement falls within the scope of the FAA
where a written contract containing an arbitration agreement involves any
maritime transaction or evidences a transaction involving interstate com-
merce. 629
When deciding whether federal or state law is controlling, state courts
may apply an objective test to determine if, at the time the agreement was
signed, the parties contemplated "substantial interstate activity.' 630 This anal-
619. Id. at -, 702 P.2d at 914.
620. 600 F. Supp. 92 (1984).
621. Id. at 94.
622. Id.
623. Id. at 94-95.
624. 491 A.2d 529 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
625. Id. at 534.
626. Id.
627. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
628. See, e.g., Martin v. Norwood, 395 Mass. 159, - , 478 N.E.2d 955, 957
(1985).
629. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
630. See, e.g., Riverfront Properties, LTD v. Max Factor III, 460 So. 2d 948,
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ysis, however, may be avoided if the choice between state and federal law is
not outcome determinative, 631 or if the question of whether federal law is
controlling, is not affirmatively asserted on appeal. 632 In addition, the right
to have an arbitration agreement decided by federal law may be lost if not
asserted at the trial court level. 633
In Riverfront Properties v. Max Factor 111,634 the court applied an ob-
jective test to determine if, at the time the agreement was signed, the parties
contemplated substantial interstate activity. In Riverfront, the parties entered
into an agreement to use their jointly-owned property as security for a
$4,000,000 loan from a Florida lending institution. 635 Max Factor, after the
execution of the loan agreement, filed a suit for partition and sale of the
land being used as security. 636 Riverfront, contending this was a breach of
the contract's provision which prohibited either party from doing anything
which would lead to default, filed a motion to stay the partition proceeding
pending arbitration. 637 The appeals court asserted that the trial court had
denied the motion to stay because the contract incorporated the laws of
California, and therefore, the arbitration agreement was not enforceable
under Florida state law. 63 On appeal, Riverfront claimed that the arbitration
agreement was enforceable under the FAA. 639
The appeals court held that the arbitration agreement was not enforce-
able under federal law because at the time the parties entered into the agree-
ment, they did not contemplate the sufficient degree of interstate activity
"necessary to invoke the FAA." 64 In reaching its conclusion that the agree-
ment did not contemplate a sufficient degree of interstate activity, the court
noted that this was a joint venture of California corporations, represented
by California counsel, with all communications between parties intrastate,
and with the contract incorporating the laws of California. 64 The court
953 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (quoting Metro Industr. Painting v. Terminal Constr.
Co., 287 F.2d 382, 387 (1961)).
631. See, e.g., McCrary Eng'g. Corp. v. Town of Upland, 472 N.E.2d 1305,
1306 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985); Village of Cairo v. Bodine Contracting Co., 685 S.W.2d
253, 258 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
632. See, e.g., Old Dominion Ins. Co. v. Dependable Reinsurance Co., 472
So. 2d 1365, 1367 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
633. See, e.g., Williams v. Hardy, 468 So. 2d 429, 430 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985).
634. 460 So. 2d 948 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
635. Id. at 949.
636. Id. at 950.
637. Id.
638. Id. at 952.
639. Id. at 954.
640. Id.
641. Id. at 953. The court indicated that there were three types of evidence
important to the application of the test: 1) the terms of the contract, 2) how the
parties expected the contract to be performed, and 3) how it was performed. Id.
(citing Metro Industr. Painting v, Terminal Constr. Corp., 287 F.2d 382 (1961)).
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indicated that its decision was affected by Riverfront's failure to offer evi-
dence of how the parties expected to perform the agreement and how the
agreement was actually performed. 4 2 The court denied the petition for writ
of certiorari and remanded the case for further proceedings in Max Factor's
suit for partition. 643
In McCrary Engineering Corp. v. Town of Upland,6" the court avoided
the question of whether the FAA preempted state law because the choice
between state or federal law would not affect the outcome. The court declined
to reach the constitutional question of whether Congress had the power to
regulate a contract between a private corporation and an Indiana town."
5
The court applied both Indiana and federal law to the question of the en-
forceability of an arbitration agreement contained in a contract signed by an
Indiana townboard president, who was not authorized by the board to sign. 646
The court ruled that the contract would not be enforceable under either state
or federal law.6
7
In Gulf Interstate Engineering v. Pecos Pipeline,64a the court reviewed
the applicable state and federal laws and concluded that under both laws,
an arbitration agreement was not enforceable if it was a product of fraud." 9
In Gulf, Pecos stopped making payments for operating a pipeline under an
existing contract to Gulf and filed a suit against Gulf for deceptive trade
practices. 6 0 Gulf moved to have the suit stayed pending arbitration. 611 Pecos
claimed that the arbitration clause contained within their contract was unen-
forceable because Pecos had been fraudulently induced to enter into the
arbitration agreement. 652 On appeal, the court held that an arbitration agree-
ment, under both federal and state law, was not enforceable if it was a
product of fraud. 65  The court then applied state law to determine if the
arbitration agreement was enforceable. 654 The court held that the record con-
tained sufficient indications that Gulf had falsely represented to Pecos that
the arbitration agreement had been approved by the Pecos lawyers to warrant
a finding that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable. 5 The court did
not discuss federal law with respect to the issue of fraud. 656
642. Riverfront, 460 So. 2d at 954.
643. Id.
644. 472 N.E.2d 1305, 1306 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).
645. Id. at 1306.
646. Id. at 1307.
647. Id. at 1308.
648. 680 S.W.2d 879 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
649. Id. at 880-81.
650. Id. at 880.
651. Id.
652. Id. at 881.
653. Id.
654. Id. at 882.
655. Id. at 883.
656. Id. at 880-81.
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In Village of Cairo v. Bodine Contracting Co.,657 the court stated that
a choice between state and federal law was unnecessary. In Cairo, a dispute
arose between the parties with respect to Cairo's progress payments to Bodine
under contracts for the construction of a sewage and treatment system.
658
Cairo filed both a suit for breach of contract a motion to stay arbitration.
65 9
The trial court granted Cairo's motion to stay arbitration because Bodine
did not continue to perform during the dispute, thereby failing to fulfill a
condition precedent to Bodine's right to demand arbitration. 66 The appeals
court held that the language of the arbitration agreement did not create a
condition precedent to Bodine's right of arbitration under either state or
federal law. 66' The court noted that a choice between the two bodies of law
would generally be unnecessary because states which have enacted the UAA
"share the disposition of the FAA to enforce arbitration agreements as a
matter of cogent public policy in favor of resolution of disputes without
resort to the courts."6 2
Additionally in Cairo, the court indicated that it could apply either state
or federal law because of Cairo's failure to affirmatively assert inadequate
notice or want of involvement in interstate commerce on appeal.63 Initially,
Cairo had disputed the enforceability of the arbitration agreement in a trial
court proceeding. 6" Cairo contended that the agreement was not enforceable
under state law because it did not comply with a Missouri law requiring
notice of the arbitration clause to be given in ten-point capital letters adjacent
to or above the place for signature.6 5 Cairo also challenged the enforcement
of the agreement under federal law on the grounds that the contract did not
evidence a transaction involving interstate commerce. 6" However, Cairo
dropped these issues in later trial court proceedings and did not assert them
on appeal.67
657. 685 S.W.2d 253, 258 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (The case involved two contracts
and two arbitration clauses. The second arbitration agreement contained an ambiguity
which was construed against its proponent, Cairo.).
658. Id. at 256.
659. Id. at 257.
660. Id. at 259.
661. Id. at 261.
662. Id. at 258.
663. Id. at 257.
664. Id.
665. Id.; Mo. REV. STAT. § 435.460 (Supp. 1986). Other states which have
special notice laws are Texas, South Carolina, and Tennessee. TEX. REv. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 224-1 (Vernon Supp. 1986); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-10(a) (Law Co-op
Supp. 1982). (Both states require a typed, underlined notice in capital letters on the
first page of the contract.); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-5-302 (Supp. 1986) (Requires that
arbitration clauses in contracts involving farming or residence of a party must ad-
ditionally be signed or initialed by the parties.).
666. Cairo, 685 S.W.2d 253, 257 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
667. Id. at 257.
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In Old Dominion Insurance v. Dependable Reinsurance,66s the court did
not discuss the commerce question because Dependable made no assertion
that the contract did not involve interstate commerce. In Dominion, a dispute
arose pertaining to a payment due to Dependable under their retrocession
agreement. 669 Dependable requested arbitration, however; Old Dominion
wished to delay arbitration until they had an opportunity to inspect De-
pendable's records. 670 In response to Old Dominion's request to inspect the
records, Dependable filed suit.67' The trial court denied Old Dominion's
motion to compel arbitration on the grounds that the arbitration agreement
was not enforceable under Florida law. 672 In addition, the trial court ruled
that Old Dominion was in default of the arbitration agreement because of
Old Dominion's request for information and delay in apointing an arbitra-
tor.673 Old Dominion appealed the trial court's ruling on the grounds that
the arbitration agreement was enforceable under federal law, and under fed-
eral law, Old Dominion was not in default. 674 The appeals court stated that
Dependable had not disputed that the contract evidenced a transaction in-
volving interstate commerce. The court ruled that Old Dominion was not in
default, therefore; no bar existed to prevent the arbitration agreement from
being enforced under federal law. 67
In Williams v. Hardy,676 the court held that the issue of federal preemp-
tion was waived because it was not raised at the trial court level. In Williams,
the parties had entered into a contract containing an arbitration clause whereby
Williams agreed to perform an outdoor concert. 677 Williams breached this
contract, and the promoter filed a suit for damages. The arbitration agree-
ment called for the laws of New York to control. Therefore, the arbitration
agreement was not enforceable under Florida law. 678 On appeal, Williams
asserted for the first time that the arbitration agreement was enforceable
under federal substantive law. The appeals court held that Williams had
waived this argument. 679 The court stated that its holding was necessary to
prevent Williams, after losing his case to the jury, from getting a reversal
668. 472 So. 2d 1365, 1367 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
669. Id. at 1366.
670. Id.
671. Id. at 1367.
672. Id.. The arbitration agreement was not enforceable under Florida law
because the agreement called on the laws of another jurisdiction to control in arbi-
tration. See Damora v. Stresscon Int'l, Inc., 324 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1975); see FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 682.02 (West Supp. 1986).
673. Old Dominion, 472 So. 2d at 1367.
674. Id. at 1368.
675. Id.
676. 468 So. 2d 429 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
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on appeal enabling him to present his case for a second time to an arbi-
trator.
680
The preemption of state law by the FAA may have limited impact in
states which have enacted the UAA because of their similar policy orientation.
Because courts have avoided the commerce question, they have not yet estab-
lished the parameters of preemption. However, the policy behind federal
preemption may be accomplished through the process of avoiding the com-
merce question, thereby encouraging the development of state arbitration law
in agreement with federal arbitration law. On occasion, however, the preemp-
tion may allow enforcement of arbitration agreements where unique state
laws would render an arbitration agreement unenforceable. 6 '
680. Id.
681. An arbitration agreement which does not comply with a state's notice
provision could be enforced if it falls within the scope of the FAA. See supra note
665 and accompanying text. Also, an arbitration agreement was enforced under the
FAA when it did not comply with state law prohibiting the agreements which incor-
porate the laws of another jurisdiction. See, supra note 672 and accompanying text;
see generally, Note, Federal Preemption of Arbitration, 1984 Mo. J. DisPuTE REs-
OLUTION 197-99 (discussion of various unique state laws).
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